THE EFFECTS OF HYPERVIGILANCE ON DECISION-MAKING DURING CRITICAL INCIDENTS by Junger, Paul M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2018-09
THE EFFECTS OF HYPERVIGILANCE ON
DECISION-MAKING DURING CRITICAL INCIDENTS
Junger, Paul M.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/60416
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.








THE EFFECTS OF HYPERVIGILANCE ON 
DECISION-MAKING DURING CRITICAL INCIDENTS 
by 
Paul M. Junger 
September 2018 
Thesis Advisor: Mollie R. McGuire 
Second Reader: Lauren S. Fernandez 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions 
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 September 2018  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master’s thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
THE EFFECTS OF HYPERVIGILANCE ON DECISION-MAKING DURING 
CRITICAL INCIDENTS 
 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
  
 6. AUTHOR(S) Paul M. Junger 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)     
 While law enforcement defines the term “hypervigilance” in its training and operations to describe 
awareness of a potentially dangerous situation, research describes hypervigilance as a state of panic that 
often results in regrettable decision-making. The disconnect between academic conceptualization and the 
applied use of hypervigilance results in a lack of understanding in police contexts, a deficit of what accounts 
for the phenomenon, and a deficiency in  mitigation. This thesis breaks hypervigilance into its three 
relevant constructs: anxiety, fear, and acute stress, and examines interrelated effects on critical incident 
decision-making by conducting a rigorous literature review of each field. Current training, through 
repetition, builds false expertise by automating responses without applying rational thought. Changing law 
enforcement’s training curriculum to one that is built on cognitive conditioning through exposure training 
may enable better, more efficient intuitive decisions that are grounded in relevant experience and expertise. 
This thesis suggests a transformation in law enforcement training as a foundation to optimize intuitive 
decision-making in critical incident situations. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
anxiety, awareness, cognitive conditioning, crisis, critical incident, decision-making, 
emotional arousal, fear, hypervigilance, panic, stress 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 123 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THE EFFECTS OF HYPERVIGILANCE ON DECISION-MAKING  
DURING CRITICAL INCIDENTS 
Paul M. Junger 
Major of Police, Dallas Police Department 
BAS, University of North Texas, 2015 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
September 2018 
Approved by: Mollie R. McGuire 
 Advisor 
 Lauren S. Fernandez 
 Second Reader 
Erik J. Dahl  
Associate Chair for Instruction,  
Department of National Security Affairs 
  
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 While law enforcement defines the term “hypervigilance” in its training and 
operations to describe awareness of a potentially dangerous situation, research describes 
hypervigilance as a state of panic that often results in regrettable decision-making. The 
disconnect between academic conceptualization and the applied use of hypervigilance 
results in a lack of understanding in police contexts, a deficit of what accounts for the 
phenomenon, and a deficiency in  mitigation. This thesis breaks hypervigilance into its 
three relevant constructs: anxiety, fear, and acute stress, and examines interrelated effects 
on critical incident decision-making by conducting a rigorous literature review of each 
field. Current training, through repetition, builds false expertise by automating responses 
without applying rational thought. Changing law enforcement’s training curriculum to 
one that is built on cognitive conditioning through exposure training may enable better, 
more efficient intuitive decisions that are grounded in relevant experience and expertise. 
This thesis suggests a transformation in law enforcement training as a foundation to 
optimize intuitive decision-making in critical incident situations. 
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Every year police are involved in deadly force encounters that mortally wound 
citizens. Several high-profile incidents, like the fatal shooting of Michael Brown in 
Ferguson, Missouri, the fatal chokehold of Eric Garner by a New York City police 
officer, and the fatal shooting of James Boyd killed by an Albuquerque, New Mexico 
police officer, have propelled law enforcement’s critical incident decision making into 
the media spotlight and caused civil unrest.  
It is not the intention of law enforcement to wound citizens mortally. Officer 
Johannes Mehserle shot and killed Oscar Grant while Grant was lying in a prone position 
at a public transit station.1 Mehserle’s encounter began while responding to a disturbance 
that ended when he mistakenly shot Oscar Grant with a pistol, while intending to use his 
Taser instead. During Mehserle’s trial, a 31-year law enforcement consultant and forensic 
criminologist specializing in force testified that the officer’s confusion was evidence of 
the phenomenon known as hypervigilance. Hypervigilance, as defined in academic 
literature, is a panic-like state in which decision-making processes break down.2 Officer 
Mehserle initially thought he had shot Grant with his Taser, not his firearm, implying he 
overreacted out of fear of being injured or killed by Grant, which resulted in his 
confusion between his Taser and firearm. Throughout this thesis, examples, such as the 
Mehserle shooting, are referenced by linking real-world examples of hypervigilance to its 
underlying constructs.  
These examples highlight how hypervigilance can affect decision making in 
critical situations. It is important for law enforcement to understand this condition better 
to avoid deadly mistakes. Unfortunately, the misapplication of the term hypervigilance in 
courtroom testimony, media headlines, and police training during acute stress warrants 
                                                 
1 Ron Martinelli, “Murder-or-Stress-Induced-Hypervigilance,” Porac Law Enforcement News, 
December 2010, 36, http://www.cti-home.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Murder-or-Stress-Induced-
Hypervigilance.pdf. 
2 Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and 
Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977), 51. 
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the need to define it. In fact, police training often uses the terms vigilance and 
hypervigilance to describe levels of awareness in the survival mechanism. Law 
enforcement training describes hypervigilance as a desired state of increased awareness. 
This description is very different from the academic definition, which defines 
hypervigilance as a state of panic resulting in hasty decision making that can end with 
regrettable outcomes.3 This disconnect can preclude law enforcement from understanding 
hypervigilance (the panic-like state) in police contexts, what accounts for the 
phenomenon, and what mitigation and training techniques may help to prevent adverse 
reactions. 
This thesis conceptualizes the term hypervigilance. It examines relevant studies of 
anxiety, fear, and acute stress for interrelated effects on decision making by conducting a 
rigorous literature review. Existing research is analyzed to examine whether training or 
personnel selection can mitigate the adverse effects of hypervigilance.  
This thesis finds that current literature on hypervigilance fails to consider how 
expertise and overconfidence, created during training, affects decision making. This 
thesis suggests a transformation in law enforcement training as a foundation to optimize 
intuitive decision making based on expertise while maintaining an analytical approach. 
After a review of the literature, a more appropriate teaching method is recommended, as 
rote training, without stress exposure and cognitive conditioning, can contribute to 
overconfidence in officers’ ability when using force.  
This thesis recommends exploring real-world experiences and theoretical 
applications of how appropriate training can diminish improper critical decision making 
and may lead to less susceptibility to hypervigilance. Perfecting the ability to differentiate 
when it is inappropriate to apply a learned response in training similar to the officers’ 
current situation is critical, or if the officers need to take better appraisal of the situation 
because of novel or ambiguous circumstances. It also recommends changing the training 
                                                 
3 Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, “Coping with Decisional Conflict: An Analysis of How Stress 
Affects Decision-Making Suggests Interventions to Improve the Process,” American Scientist 64, no. 6 
(November–December 1976): 658, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27847557. 
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curricula to those built on cognitive conditioning through exposure training to enable 
better, more efficient intuitive decisions grounded in relevant experience and expertise.  
Cognitive conditioning through an awareness of officers’ stress responses can 
shape automated responses (intuitive) based on their higher skill levels (expertise). The 
more officers make decisions during stressful environments, the more familiar they 
become with their decision-making processes and performance during a crisis (expertise) 
until they do it without deliberatively thinking (intuitively).4 Research on expertise-based 
intuition serves as the foundation for cognitive conditioning through officers’ awareness 
to stress. Salas and colleagues define expertise-based intuition as, “The intuitions 
occurring at these later stages of development where the decision maker has developed a 
deep and rich knowledge base from extensive experience within a domain.”5 The 
objective is to enable officers to make optimal intuitive decisions, while being familiar 
with high-stress reactions, thereby making them less susceptible to hypervigilance.  
This thesis also suggests future research on if receiving a radio-call primes 
officers’ responses before getting to the situation. It suggests that the comments made by 
a dispatcher during a call may serve as an anchoring effect that starts a cognitive bias that 
can result in officers’ overreliance on their own bias during their decision-making 
processes.6 If officers receive calls that primes their expectations of a situation (e.g., a 
call about a man with a gun), the officers are going to see cues in the environment that 
confirm these preexisting beliefs, even if they may not be accurate (e.g., the man had a 
pipe in his hand and not a gun).  
                                                 
4 Eduardo Salas, Michael A. Rosen, and Deborah DiazGranados, “Expertise-Based Intuition and 
Decision Making in Organizations,” Journal of Management 36, no. 4 (July 2010): 944, https://doi. 
org/10.1177/0149206309350084. 
5 Salas, Rosen, and DiazGranados, 944. 
6 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011), 119. 
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I. THE NEED TO FIND A BALANCED SENSE OF AWARENESS 
Don’t let your emotions get in the way of rational decision making. 
~ Roy L. Bennett  
 
A. BACKGROUND 
In January 2009, in Oakland, California, a routine encounter between a Bay Area 
Rapid Transit police officer responding to a fight in the subway ended with an officer-
involved shooting and a dead citizen. Officer Johannes Mehserle shot and killed Oscar 
Grant while Grant was lying in a prone position at a public transit station.1 This incident 
sparked nationwide controversy over the officer’s apparent use of excessive force. Ron 
Martinelli, a law enforcement consultant with over three decades of experience and 
forensic criminologist specializing in force, testified that the officer’s confusion was 
evidence of the phenomenon known as hypervigilance. Officer Mehserle initially thought 
he had shot Grant with his Taser, not his firearm. According to Martinelli’s testimony, 
Mehserle did not intentionally set out to use lethal force. Martinelli’s testimony implied 
Mehserle reacted out of fear for his own life, which resulted in his confusion between his 
Taser and firearm. Martinelli testified:  
I have also found a clear nexus between a lack of appropriate force 
training, officer maturity and situational awareness with the occasional 
tragic consequences of accidental and excessively applied force. I find a 
big difference between an intentional and excessive quantum of force and 
force applied mistakenly during a period of acute hypervigilance that 
causes death. When threatened, humans will only react in one or more of 
five separate states: (1) assume a defense posture (fight); (2) disengage 
from the threat (flee); (3) posture-raise a voice, puff up their chest, 
aggressive gestures; (4) hypervigilance-defined as panic, confusion, 
freezing and/or performing an irrational act; and (5) submit surrender.2 
                                                 
1 Ron Martinelli, “Murder-or-Stress-Induced-Hypervigilance,” Porac Law Enforcement News, 
December 2010, 36, http://www.cti-home.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Murder-or-Stress-Induced-
Hypervigilance.pdf. 
2 Martinelli, 36. 
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This example highlights how hypervigilance can affect decision making in critical 
situations. Regrettably, the use of the term hypervigilance in courtroom testimony (as 
with this example), media headlines, and police training is misapplied, as it relates to 
critical incident performance and justifies the need to define it. In fact, police training 
often uses the terms vigilance and hypervigilance to describe levels of awareness in the 
survival mechanism, but this description may be an inappropriate application of the term. 
Hypervigilance, as defined in academic literature, is not an increased state of awareness, 
but instead a panic-like state in which decision-making processes break down.3 This 
disconnect in academic conceptualization and applied use results in a lack of 
understanding in police contexts. It is important to understand what accounts for the 
phenomenon, and what mitigation and training techniques may help to prevent adverse 
reactions under conditions that may also give rise to hypervigilance. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Law enforcement training conditions officers to anticipate threats by teaching 
them to operate in an elevated state of awareness. Responding to an incident in an 
elevated state of awareness is imperative to officers’ survival. Law enforcement teaches 
awareness mirrors training from U.S. military combatants. Colonel Jeff Cooper, a combat 
Marine Corps veteran, developed a combat mindset to describe four states of awareness: 
1. White: officers are unprepared to take lethal action. 
2. Yellow: officers understand their lives may be in danger and [they] may 
have to act if circumstances warrant. 
3. Orange: officers have identified specific adversaries and are prepared to 
act for their survival. The orange awareness state does not warrant lethal 
force. 
4. Red: lethal force is warranted and the officers will shoot if circumstances 
warrant.4 
                                                 
3 Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and 
Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977), 51. 
4 “Jeff Cooper’s Awareness Color Code Chart,” BSR, March 19, 2017, http://www.bsr-inc.com/aware 
ness-color-code-chart/. 
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Police officers train to operate in the yellow awareness mindset, always prepared 
to defend their own lives or the lives of innocent citizens. Operating in an elevated state 
of awareness serves a purpose in law enforcement; it keeps officers alive. However, a 
constant state of awareness may keep officers alive at the expense of others by making 
improper decisions.  
The term vigilance in Marine Corps and police officer training refers to a mental 
state of awareness relevant for survival during a tour of duty. This training cultivates a 
prolonged state of vigilance, which can subjectively escalate to hypervigilance in acute 
stress situations and cloud the decision-making ability. Vigilance can transform into 
hypervigilance through an overwhelming amount of stress and emotional arousal. 
Hypervigilance is a panic-like state experienced in a perceived life-threatening situation, 
which can leave officers unable to resolve a situation like the one described in the Bay 
Area Transit situation. Hypervigilance needs to be better understood and studied in terms 
of a dynamic concept. All officers’ cognitive processes, emotional perceptions, and 
biases are diverse and impact critical incident decision making differently. Since critical 
incident decision making is extremely diverse, the definition should be more of a concept 
that changes with the individuals and is curtailed to a specific situation. Understanding 
hypervigilance as a dynamic concept helps understand the officers’ mental state at the 
time of a critical incident. This discrepancy, between law enforcement’s use of the 
terminology and the scholars’ definition, may suggest a mischaracterization of 
hypervigilance in applied contexts. A common theme, however, are three constructs that 
serve as the foundation of hypervigilance: acute stress, fear, anxiety, and decision 
making. 
Additionally, current police teaching fails to connect theoretical aspects of stress 
on the body into practical worst-case training scenarios, which accounts for the 
phenomenon of overconfidence. Overconfidence is the officers’ beliefs they are mentally 
prepared for critical incident decision making and the effects of stress, when in reality, 
they are ill-prepared for them. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How do stress and emotional arousal alter the decision-making capability when 
officers fear imminent danger?  
Can the concept of overconfidence caused by law enforcement’s current 
inappropriate repetition during training explain hypervigilance in some instances where 
officers mistakenly use too much force?  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis conceptualizes the term hypervigilance. It examines relevant studies of 
anxiety, fear, and acute stress for interrelated effects on decision making by conducting a 
rigorous literature review. This thesis does not evaluate hypervigilance resulting from 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For the purposes of this study, (a) hypervigilance 
is limited to the phenomenon that can occur during acute stress, regardless of previous 
exposure to traumatic events, and (b) a critical incident is defined as any acute stress 
situation, up to and including using deadly force. This study explains hypervigilance and 
its effect on decision making in terms of the underlying constructs identified in the 
relevant literature. The three constructs that serve as the foundation of hypervigilance, 
acute stress, fear, and anxiety are examined separately. It also uses existing research to 
examine whether training or personnel selection can mitigate the adverse effects of 
hypervigilance. Lastly, this study proposes a different mode of training to reduce the 
effects of hypervigilance in unavoidable situations. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The pursuit for this research began for the author after living through the deadliest 
attack on law enforcement since September 11, 2011, when an ambush killed five Dallas 
officers. The perception of excessive deadly force encounters between minorities and 
white police officers resulted in the motivation for the officers’ deaths. Micah Johnson, 
the gunman identified as the shooter in the Dallas attack, spoke to police negotiators 
before officers used an improvised explosive device to neutralize him. According to 
Dallas Police Chief David Brown, Johnson told negotiators “he [Johnson] was upset at 
 5 
white people. He stated he wanted to kill white people, especially white officers” in 
response to deadly encounters against unarmed minorities killed by law enforcement.5  
Most law enforcement training and policies serve as the foundation of police 
legitimacy. Increased scrutiny of officers’ use-of-force performance happens through 
public scrutiny and erodes confidence in trust of the police. Improving performance 
during critical incidents is vital to help protect this nation’s citizens and law enforcement 
legitimacy.  
Sports medicine researchers study professional athletes to improve how they 
perform in highly stressful situations.6 Understanding the rigorous demands put on 
fighter pilots or surgeons improve their performance under extremely stressful and life-
threatening conditions.7 Life-threatening situations encountered by police officers are no 
different. Understanding and mitigating hypervigilance may enhance decision making by 
police officers during critical incidents that can lead to safer outcomes for all involved. 
Professionals with emotional self-control make better decisions and save lives by 
offsetting the effects of fear, anxiety, and acute stress. 
This thesis conceptualizes hypervigilance and synthesizes mitigation techniques 
during training to counter its effects on decision making during imminent critical stress 
incidents that happen without warning.  
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The remainder of this thesis consists of four chapters. First, this research focuses 
on existing evidence supporting the construct of hypervigilance broken down by its parts 
of anxiety, fear, acute stress, and their effects on decision making. The second aim of this 
                                                 
5 Manny Fernandez, Richard Pérez-Peña, and Jonah Engel Bromwich, “Five Dallas Officers Were 
Killed as Payback, Police Chief Says,” New York Times, sec. U.S., July 8, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/07/09/us/dallas-police-shooting.html. 
6 Jocelyn Faubert, “Professional Athletes Have Extraordinary Skills for Rapidly Learning Complex and 
Neutral Dynamic Visual Scenes,” Scientific Reports 3, no. 1 (December 2013): 2, https://doi.org/10.1038/ 
srep01154. 
7 Roger G. Green, “Stress and Accidents,” Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 56, no. 7 
(1985): 639. 
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research is to focus on an analysis of the individual constructs to define and mitigate 
hypervigilance. Finally, this research proposes training techniques to reduce the harmful 
consequences of hypervigilance by incorporating awareness and meditation during stress-
induced training scenarios. 
Chapter II examines an in-depth literature review of the two independent 
variables, which are the emotional effects and acute stress influence on physical, 
cognitive and decision-making processes. This chapter concludes with evidence of how 
fear and anxiety, two emotional constructs, affect the physical and cognitive process. 
Chapter III delves into evidence from literature on how anxiety, fear, and acute 
stress affect the decision-making process. These concepts describe how stress affects the 
body and decision making. Additionally, the chapter examines vigilance and 
hypervigilance in terms of awareness and a lack of cognitive resources during critical 
decision making. The chapter ends by contrasting vigilance, where the officers’ 
awareness levels should function, and hypervigilance, which is an awareness level, 
described as a panic-like state that overwhelms cognition.  
Chapter IV provides an in-depth look at training, experience, and expertise and 
their effects on hypervigilance. It includes a proposal that integrates stress-induced worst-
case scenario training with meditation and awareness to reduce the negative effects of a 
stress response during a critical incident.  
Finally, Chapter V ends with a review of hypervigilance, which includes the 
constructs of stress, emotional reactions, and decision making, and how training 
techniques can mitigate the effects of hypervigilance.  
  
 7 
II. THE EFFECTS OF ANXIETY, FEAR, AND ACUTE STRESS 
ON AWARENESS AS A SURVIVAL MECHANISM 
Understanding the effects of hypervigilance begins with understanding how 
anxiety, fear, and acute stress affect physiological and cognitive processes. Acute stress 
and emotional arousal are overlapping bio-psychological responses to a threat, and these 
responses affect the decision-making processes. The following sections examine the 
literature pertaining to stress and the emotional arousal of anxiety and fear. The first 
section analyzes the effects of stress on critical decision making by examining 
physiological and cognitive responses. The next section discusses the emotional response 
in critical decision making by comparing anxiety and fear. Lastly, a qualitative review of 
emotional arousal and stress models are examined for how they intersect, specifically 
during critical incident decision making.  
A. ACUTE STRESS 
The Officer Down Memorial Page, a website dedicated to honoring law 
enforcement officers killed in the line of duty, shows 230 law enforcement officers killed 
in the line of duty from January 1, 2017 to August 15, 2018.8 During the same time, the 
Washington Post reported 1,627 shootings during which people had been shot and killed 
by a police officer.9 While the decision making of civilians in critical incidents is outside 
the scope of the current thesis, understanding the effects of acute stress in critical 
incidents is an imperative first step to mitigate the unnecessary deaths of both the civilian 
and the officer involved.10  
                                                 
8 “The Officer Down Memorial Page (ODMP),” Officer Down Memorial Page, Inc., accessed April 21, 
2018, https://www.odmp.org/. 
9 John Muyskens, “Police Shootings 2017 Database,” Washington Post, sec. Investigative, July 1, 
2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2017/. 
10 This thesis considers only acute stress and not the consequences of chronic stress. Specifically, it 
considers acute stress caused by a perceived life-threatening event that induces emotional, physiological, 
and cognitive responses. 
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Starcke and Brand define stress as when “a demand exceeds the regulatory 
capacity of an organism, particularly in situations that are unpredictable and 
uncontrollable. Stress elicits psychological, physiological and behavioral reactions that 
differ substantially across individuals.”11 Building on this definition, Latack and McGrath 
conceptualize stress as a struggle between perceived demands and the perceived ability to 
cope with those demands.12 This thesis primarily focuses on stress as a perceived threat 
meeting individuals’ perceived ability to cope with or escape a situation. Using these 
concepts, the following section analyzes the physiological and psychological responses 
resulting from the stress response elicited by the perceived inability to cope. 
1. Physiological Effects of Stress 
In response to a stressor, a fast-acting sympathetic-adrenal-medullary (SAM) 
system and a slower-acting hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis are activated. The 
activated SAM and HPA activity prompts the release of catecholamines and 
glucocorticoids, respectively. The catecholamines released include adrenaline 
(epinephrine), noradrenaline (norepinephrine), and dopamine. In humans, the 
glucocorticoid released is cortisol (cortisol is the term used going forward). Each 
hormone serves a unique function. Adrenaline enters into the bloodstream quickly for an 
immediate survival response whereas cortisol prolongs the stress response by appearing 
later in the cycle.13 Collectively, the release of catecholamines results in both rapid and 
prolonged increase in heart rate, breathing, and blood pressure.14 Both catecholamines 
and cortisol have been shown to affect activity in different parts of the brain, including 
                                                 
11 Katrin Starcke and Matthias Brand, “Effects of Stress on Decisions under Uncertainty: A Meta-
Analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 142, no. 9 (2016): 911, https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000060. 
12 Janina C. Latack and J. E. McGrath, “Coping with Job Stress: Measures and Future Directions for 
Scale Development,” Journal of Applied Psychology 71, no. 3 (1986): 377. 
13 Stephan Pabst, Matthias Brand, and Oliver T. Wolf, “Stress and Decision Making: A Few Minutes 
Make All the Difference,” Behavioural Brain Research 250 (August 2013): 40, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.b 
br.2013.04.046. 
14 E. Ron de Kloet, Marian Joëls, and Florian Holsboer, “Stress and the Brain: From Adaptation to 
Disease,” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 6, no. 6 (June 2005): 464, https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn1683. 
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those associated with decision making.15 The changes in the body and the brain due to 
catecholamine and cortisol release affect physical and cognitive performance in 
preparation for survival.16  
a. Sympathetic-Adrenal-Medullary System 
Literature indicates a correlation between the emotional reaction to perceived 
threat and the body’s SAM response to acute stress.17 According to stress literature, once 
the body releases adrenaline and noradrenaline in a response to a perceived threat, the 
heart rate, breathing, and blood pressure increase rapidly, which then affects performance 
in preparation for survival.18 Increased blood flow to major muscle groups and organs, 
along with increased muscle tension, provides strength for fighting or running. Increased 
energy, breathing, and heart rate prepare the body for survival if an injury occurs. Blood 
clotting functions in the body speed up to prevent excessive blood loss in the event of 
injury. Depletion of cognitive resources caused by the body’s SAM response can have 
both beneficial and damaging consequences, such as pupil dilation, auditory exclusion, 
tunnel vision, and shaking.19 Tunnel vision and auditory exclusion ensues when vision 
narrows and hearing diminishes by focusing intensely on a threatening cue.20 Since 
vision and hearing is affected by a threatening cue, peripheral vision, and hearing is 
drastically reduced, which creates the possibility of missing other details.21 This concept 
is important in understanding what may affect decision making in life threatening 
situations. The physiological effects of SAM activity serve as the basis for the survival 
response known as fight, fright, or freeze. 
                                                 
15 de Kloet, Joëls, and Holsboer, 469. 
16 de Kloet, Joëls, and Holsboer, 464. 
17 Starcke and Brand, “Effects of Stress on Decisions under Uncertainty,” 911. 
18 de Kloet, Joëls, and Holsboer, “Stress and the Brain,” 464. 
19 Laurie Kelly McCorry, “Physiology of the Autonomic Nervous System,” American Journal of 
Pharmaceutical Education 71, no. 4, art. 78 (September 2007): 1, https://doi.org/10.5688/aj710478. 
20 McCorry, 7–8. 
21 McCorry, 7–8. 
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The hypothalamus initiates the SAM, which consists of the adrenal medulla. The 
adrenal medulla produces adrenaline, noradrenaline, and dopamine.22 The SAM is fast-
acting, starting on onset of the acute stressor, and not returning to baseline until about 10 
minutes post-stressor.23 Adrenaline prepares the body to stay and fight or run away from 
the threat for survival. 
For years, the fight, flight, or freeze survival response was known as the fight-or-
flight response.24 The fight-or-flight response is a physiological response that prepares 
individuals to (a) fight―to stay and defend themselves during an attack, or 
(b)―flight―to run from the dangerous situation. The fight-or-flight response stems from 
catecholamines released as part of the SAM response in preparation for a violent 
muscular action for fighting or running.25  
Relatively new research indicates freezing, a third response to a threat, stems from 
noradrenaline. The act of freezing is the inability to fight or flee by simply freezing and 
doing nothing and is referred to as tonic immobility. Schmidt et al. suggest freezing, or 
tonic immobility, may occur when the competing actions of fleeing or fighting are likely 
to be ineffective in the situation.26 They illustrate the evolutionary concept in the wild 
where some animals “play dead” as the best option to avoid being attacked since escaping 
or winning a fight is unlikely.  
The noradrenaline released during a stress response is also associated with 
arousal, hyper-alertness, increased panic, or dread.27 High levels of noradrenaline are 
associated with panic attacks, an overwhelming feeling of shortness of breath, and 
                                                 
22 Starcke and Brand, “Effects of Stress on Decisions under Uncertainty,” 912. 
23 Starcke and Brand, 912. 
24 Norman B. Schmidt et al., “Exploring Human Freeze Responses to a Threat Stressor,” Journal of 
Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry 39, no. 3 (September 2008): 292, https://doi.org/10.1016/ 
j.jbtep.2007.08.002. 
25 de Kloet, Joëls, and Holsboer, “Stress and the Brain,” 464. 
26 Schmidt et al., “Exploring Human Freeze Responses to a Threat Stressor,” 2. 
27 Jack M. Gorman et al., “Neuroanatomical Hypothesis of Panic Disorder, Revised,” American 
Journal of Psychiatry 157, no. 4 (2000): 495, http://ajp.psychiatryonline.org/doi/abs/10.1176/appi. 
ajp.157.4.493.  
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feelings of suffocation, numbness, and chest pain, which may be detrimental during 
critical incident decision making.28  
b. Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal Axis 
The HPA consists of the hypothalamus, anterior pituitary, and the adrenal cortex. 
The HPA impacts memory and cognition. As the physiological effects of stress initiated 
by the body’s SAM response to acute stress begin, a similar reaction to fear is initiated by 
the body’s HPA response. The hypothalamus in the brain starts the process by sending 
signals to the pituitary gland and the adrenal cortex.29 The HPA releases cortisol that 
results in changes in the brain that then affects cognitive performance in preparation for 
survival.30 Cognitive perception is processed in the limbic brain structures that consist of 
the hippocampus and amygdala, and is closely linked to the prefrontal cortex.31 Cortisol 
is responsible for increased energy by releasing supply of glucose from the liver.32 
Cortisol also aids in survival by controlling swelling during a life-threatening situation.  
Cortisol negatively impacts long-term memory, but can be beneficial in short-
term, immediate recall memory. Excessive cortisol can impair the hippocampus’s ability 
to recall memories. De Kloet et al.’s review found that cortisol creates “increased arousal, 
alertness, vigilance, focused attention and cognitive processing.”33 Peak concentrations in 
cortisol levels occur in 21–40 minutes and lasts for up to 90 minutes.34 Cortisol levels can 
take over an hour to return to baseline levels when higher levels of stress are experienced. 
                                                 
28 Gorman et al., 497. 
29 de Kloet, Joëls, and Holsboer, “Stress and the Brain,” 464. 
30 de Kloet, Joëls, and Holsboer, 464. 
31 de Kloet, Joëls, and Holsboer, 463. 
32 de Kloet, Joëls, and Holsboer, 464. 
33 de Kloet, Joëls, and Holsboer, 463. 
34 Starcke and Brand, “Effects of Stress on Decisions under Uncertainty,” 912. 
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2. Stress and Cognition 
Acute stress has an impact on cognition, memory, and decision making.35 
Executive functions refer to higher-level cognitive activities including thinking, 
reasoning, understanding, and learning.36 The duration and intensity of acute stress 
during critical incidents impact attention and learning functions.  
A review of existing literature by Sandi examines the relationship between the 
magnitude and duration of stress on cognition.37 The purpose of her meta-analysis was to 
delve into the stress effects of “implicit or explicit memory, working memory, goal-
directed behavior and habit learning.”38 The findings from Sandi’s review indicate habit-
forming tasks, or training, can mitigate the negative effects of stress through 
preparedness. This review supports the idea that decision making during acute stress 
occurs using either the prefrontal cortex for analytical thinking or the amygdala for 
intuitive thinking.39 Luksys, Gerstner, and Sandi suggest that complex and flexible 
reasoning occurs in the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex whereas implicit memory and 
well-rehearsed tasks occur in the amygdala.40 Sandi’s review indicates that 
overwhelming stress weakens explicit memory and impairs decision making when an 
individual is performing functions that have not been well rehearsed. Her review also 
finds the impact of acute stress on well-rehearsed tasks is not as profound. During a 
lecture, LeDoux supports the idea of two separate ways of thinking, intuitively or 
heuristically. LeDoux explained that signals processed through the cortex are a top-down 
                                                 
35 Carmen Sandi, “Stress and Cognition,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 4, no. 3 
(June 2013): 254, https://doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1222. 
36 Grant S. Shields, Matthew A. Sazma, and Andrew P. Yonelinas, “The Effects of Acute Stress on 
Core Executive Functions: A Meta-Analysis and Comparison with Cortisol,” Neuroscience & 
Biobehavioral Reviews 68 (September 2016): 651, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.06.038. 
37 Sandi, “Stress and Cognition,” 254. 
38 Sandi, 245. 
39 Sandi, 255. 
40 Gediminas Luksys, Wulfram Gerstner, and Carmen Sandi, “Stress, Genotype and Norepinephrine in 
the Prediction of Mouse Behavior Using Reinforcement Learning,” Nature Neuroscience 12, no. 9 
(September 2009): 1185, https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.2374; Gediminas Luksys and Carmen Sandi, “Neural 
Mechanisms and Computations Underlying Stress Effects on Learning and Memory,” Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology 21, no. 3 (June 2011): 505, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2011.03.003. 
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process, are more accurate but slower, taking about 150–250 milliseconds or more. In 
contrast, bottom-up signals are processed through the amygdala and are quicker, 
responding in about 20–80 milliseconds, but are less accurate.41 
Starcke and Brand’s study on decision making in stressful situations examined 
whether individuals take chances under stress.42 Their research stemmed from a study of 
decision making involving financial gain and loss after inducing stress. Starcke and 
Brand found that individual stress reaction, not stress induction, affects decisions; a 
concept that differs from most stress literature.43 Starke and Brand describe a stress 
reaction by triggering the two biological systems associated with stress, the SAM and the 
HPA. The purpose of Starke and Brand’s research examines the effects of individuals’ 
stress reactions on performance after a stress induction.  
Pabst, Brand, and Wolf studied prolonged stress and biological reactions in 
response to stress and the subsequent effects on performance. They theorized that the 
longer people are exposed to stress, the higher the deterioration of their ability to decide 
and adequately perform. Pabst, Brand, and Wolf studied performance of the Game of 
Dice Task after undergoing the Trier social stress test (TSST). The Game of Dice Task 
gives constant information about gains and losses using a computerized decision-making 
task.44 It incorporates the TSST, which is the most accepted method for stress induction 
in a laboratory setting. Pabst, Brand, and Wolf’s study indicated that pre-frontal cortex-
dependent functions (i.e., functions that support deeper thinking) are affected by the 
release of norepinephrine and dopamine. Their study found that noradrenaline and 
dopamine cause an improvement in decision making by elevating alertness to a certain 
point.45 Once noradrenaline and dopamine exceed a maximum threshold, decision 
making degrades. The relationship between stress and performance reflects an inverted 
                                                 
41 “Why You Might Be Scared of X,” Big Think, video, 5:21, Joseph LeDoux, May 5, 2010, http://big 
think.com/videos/why-you-might-be-scared-of-x. 
42 Starcke and Brand, “Effects of Stress on Decisions under Uncertainty,” 909. 
43 Starcke and Brand, 913. 
44 Pabst, Brand, and Wolf, “Stress and Decision Making,” 40. 
45 Pabst, Brand, and Wolf, 41. 
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U-shaped relationship. Pabst, Brand, and Wolf suggest some stress-induced hormones 
enter the bloodstream quickly and increase awareness whereas effects of other hormones, 
like cortisol, appear later during the stress-related incident and have an adverse effect on 
decision making. Pabst, Brand, and Wolf’s research fails to determine whether cortisol 
itself creates risky decision making or if the cortisol is a result of the situation itself. 
Pabst’s findings are like other literature; the group exposed to the minimal amount of 
stress showed improved decision making and performance in relation to the group 
exposed to stress for a prolonged time.46 
Stress literature frequently describes the relationship between the increasing 
intensity of stress and its effects on performance as inverted U-shaped relationship.47 
Figure 1 illustrates the inverted U-shaped relationship and shows an optimal level of 
arousal on performance commonly referred to as the Yerkes-Dodson Law.48 Moderate 
stress intensity can be healthy, can sharpen alertness, and can allow individuals to 
perform at an optimal level. Increased stress intensity, up to a certain threshold, can focus 
attention by limiting the attentional resources to only relevant stimuli and leaving 
irrelevant stimuli unattended. Thus, individuals can attend solely to cues perceived to be 
a threat to their survival. In the inverted U-shaped relationship, exceeding the optimal 
level of stress then starts to deteriorate performance by overloading peoples’ ability to 
process incoming information.49 
                                                 
46 Pabst, Brand, and Wolf, 40. 
47 Pabst, Brand, and Wolf, 40; Shields, Sazma, and Yonelinas, “The Effects of Acute Stress on Core 
Executive Functions,” 663. 
48 Karl Halvor Teigen, “Yerkes-Dodson: A Law for All Seasons,” Theory & Psychology 4, no. 4 
(November 1994): 527–28, https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354394044004. 
49 Pabst, Brand, and Wolf, “Stress and Decision Making,” 40. 
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Figure 1. U-Shaped Relationship50 
a. Attention Narrowing and Focus 
Wessel and Merckelbach define attention narrowing “as a physiological arousal 
resulting in attention being directed towards central rather than peripheral characteristics 
of the situation.”51 Artwohl and Grossman studied law enforcement officers’ attention 
and found attention narrowing is common during critical incident decision making. 
Artwohl studied 72 officers involved in deadly force encounters and found that almost 90 
percent of the officers sensed “tunnel vision,” and 65 percent reported, “heightened visual 
clarity.”52 In a separate study, Grissom interviewed 458 respondents on survival stress to 
examine what causes tunnel vision and heightened visual clarity. Grissom surmised that 
the narrowing of attention or heightened visual clarity might be due to stress limiting 
                                                 
50 Source: Karl Halvor Teigen, “Yerkes-Dodson: A Law for All Seasons,” Theory & Psychology 4, no. 
4 (November 1994): 534, https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354394044004. 
51 Ineke Wessel and Harald Merckelbach, “The Impact of Anxiety on Memory for Details in Spider 
Phobics,” Applied Cognitive Psychology 11, no. 3 (June 1997): 223. 
52 Loren W. Christensen and Alexis Artwohl, Deadly Force Encounters: What Cops Need to Know to 
Mentally and Physically Prepare for and Survive a Gunfight (Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1997), 252. 
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cognitive resources during critical incidents. His interviews found that “48 percent 
experienced tunnel vision during the event, 19 percent experienced issues with depth 
perception, 10 percent lost the ability to focus on close objects, 15 percent lost the ability 
to perform precision hand/eye coordination and 55 percent perceived time to slow 
down.”53  
These reactions due to attention narrowing (i.e., alterations in sensory perception, 
such as tunnel vision, tunnel hearing, time distortion, loss of depth perception, and visual 
dominance) continue to degrade under acute stress until they begin to break down.54 
Incoming information within visual and audible fields are ignored or are not processed 
unless they threaten survival.55 Haanstad presented the idea of perceptual alterations that 
occur during traumatic events. His research was based on Thai police involved in 
terrorism who perceived temporal and spatial distortions during life-threatening events.56 
The research describes tachypsychia, a perceptual phenomenon known to speed up or 
slow down the mind, which creates time distortion.57 According to the study, individuals 
experiencing tachypsychia during stressful incidents describe its effects as moving in 
slow motion while others describe time passing in a blur. The study found that 
tachypsychia occurs when a stimulus overwhelms perceptual performance and the mind 
focuses on nothing else.58  
                                                 
53 James Cullen Grissom, “Visual Distortion during Periods of Survival Stress and the Implications for 
Survival Skills Training” (master’s thesis, Sam Houston State University, 2002), 11, https://shsu-ir.tdl.org/ 
bitstream/handle/20.500.11875/1242/0853.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
54 Mark A. Staal, Stress, Cognition, and Human Performance: A Literature Review and Conceptual 
Framework (Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center, 2004), 25, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp 
?R=20060017835. 
55 Staal, 22. 
56 Eric J. Haanstad, “Violence and Temporal Subjectivity: Violence and Temporal Subjectivity,” 
Anthropology and Humanism 34, no. 1 (June 2009): 72–73, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1409.2009. 
01025.x. 
57 Haanstad, 73. 
58 Haanstad, 72–74. 
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Alomari et al. conducted a study on acute stress and its effects on sustained 
attention.59 The study consisted of a control group and a test group of 33 total 
participants. Stress was introduced in the test group using two methods. Stress was 
induced by subjecting the study group to a cold pressor stress test (CPT), where 
participants submerge their hand in 3ºC water for one minute and measuring changes in 
blood pressure and heart rate, and by viewing traumatic images. After the induction of the 
CPT, the participants provided a saliva sample that was used a baseline. The participants 
were tested three times during the experiment in three blocks, 1–15 minutes, 15–30 
minutes, and 30–40 minutes, respectively. The second stress induction consisted of 105 
pictures randomly shown to each participant that totaled 35 negative, 35 neutral, and 35 
positive images. Stress induction was measured by collecting salivary cortisol levels and 
EEG readings. The performance measure was sustained attention to task-related thoughts. 
The study found that continuous attention degrades after experiencing acute stress. The 
study also found that a heightened emotional state remained consistent for both emotional 
and non-emotional pictures. The study suggests that acute stress causes a reduction in 
sustained attention.60 
The process of attention narrowing can be advantageous for increased threat 
detection. Henckens et al. conducted a study on selective attention and emotional 
interference to determine whether attention narrowing is associated with threat detection. 
The purpose of the study was to examine how a stressful situation shifted processes in the 
brain into a mode of hypervigilant processing to detect and assess potential threats 
prioritized by peoples’ senses.61 Seventy-two healthy males participated in the study and 
were split into three groups: a control group, slow cortisol group, and a rapid cortisol 
group. The slow cortisol group was given a capsule containing 10 mg of cortisol, a 
                                                 
59 Rima Alomari et al., “Acute Stress Dysregulates the LPP ERP Response to Emotional Pictures and 
Impairs Sustained Attention: Time-Sensitive Effects,” ed. Derek Mitchell, Brain Sciences 5, no. 2 (May 14, 
2015): 202–203, http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/brainsci5020201. 
60 Alomari et al., 218. 
61 Marloes J. A. G. Henckens et al., “Time-Dependent Effects of Cortisol on Selective Attention and 
Emotional Interference: A Functional MRI Study,” Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience 6, no. 66 (August 
2012): 1, https://doi.org/10.3389/fnint.2012.00066. 
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scientifically tested dosage that raises cortisol levels, followed by a placebo after a 
controlled amount of time.62 The fast cortisol group was given two capsules of cortisol at 
two separate times in the controlled amount of time. The control was administered two 
placebos during the same time. Each group was exposed to an emotional interference task 
that consisted of colored words. The participants observed words, written in different 
colors, and then were immediately required to press one of four buttons corresponding to 
the colors displayed. The words represent a neutral or an aversive category to incite an 
emotional reaction. Cortisol levels were measured at specific intervals during the 
experiment; a baseline was collected, 30, and 60 minutes, after the start of the 
experiment. According to Henckens et al., “Although one may benefit from sensitive 
sensory processing, it comes at a cost of unselective attention and increased distraction by 
irrelevant information.” They found that acute stress releases cortisol, a hormone that 
intensifies emotional interference and selective attention. Henckens indicates acute stress 
can “induce a state of hypervigilance.”63 The significance of this experiment suggests the 
rapid effects of cortisol heighten selective attention during threatening situations, which 
illustrates the concept that some stress is beneficial to performance.64  
Thackray and Touchstone examined the “startle response” and how it affects 
performance to sudden aircraft emergencies. Immediately after being threatened, an 
“initial orienting response to an unexpected stimulus” occurs.65 This startle reflex is a 
common reaction related to fear or anger. Crawford and Cacioppo examined the reflex 
response after experiencing fear or anger. They found that, “with survival, it is more 
important to escape from danger than to pursue an opportunity…it’s easier to recover 
from a missed opportunity than from a failed escape.”66 These findings, along with 
                                                 
62 Henckens et al., 3. 
63 Henckens et al., 1. 
64 Henckens et al., 11. 
65 Richard I. Thackray, Performance Recovery Following Startle: A Laboratory Approach to the Study 
of Behavioral Response to Sudden Aircraft Emergencies, DOT/FAA-AM-88/4 (Washington, DC: Office of 
Aviation Medicine: Federal Aviation Administration, 1988), 2. 
66 L. Elizabeth Crawford and John T. Cacioppo, “Learning Where to Look for Danger: Integrating 
Affective and Spatial Information,” Psychological Science 13, no. 5 (September 2002): 449, https://doi. 
org/10.1111/1467-9280.00479. 
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attentional narrowing, suggest that a hurried decision for survival is more important than 
exploring every available option. Attention narrowing has been described as a top-down 
and bottom-up process.67 A top-down process, according to Eysenck, is a controlled 
process. Top-down processes are synonymous to analytical decision making. A bottom-
up process, on the other hand, is automatic orientation, or a reaction to a stimulus. 
Bottom-up processes are largely responsible for reactionary decision making. These 
concepts form the basis of the attentional control theory, which associates in what 
capacity people allot their attention.  
A hasty decision for survival is the focus since some attentional resources are 
taken away from executive functioning by orienting towards a threat. Refocusing 
attentional resources towards a threat means not paying attention to anything else, which 
can result in missing other critical stimuli.  
b. Executive Resources 
Executive resources include cognitive processes, such as cognitive flexibility, 
thinking, attention, and working memory.68 Singer and Bashir define cognitive flexibility 
as a process that acts as a control function that switches between different ideas and tasks 
easily.69 They define inhibition control as emotional management and control, even 
during stressful situations. Working memory, according to Singer and Bashir, is the 
process of managing information from auditory and visual cues. Flexible thinking, 
inhibition, and working memory allow individuals to plan, focus attention, control short-
term memory and execute multiple tasks.  
                                                 
67 Michael W. Eysenck and Nazanin Derakshan, “New Perspectives in Attentional Control Theory,” 
Personality and Individual Differences 50, no. 7 (May 2011): 959, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010. 
08.019. 
68 Bonnie D. Singer and Anthony S. Bashir, “What Are Executive Functions and Self-Regulation and 
What Do They Have to Do with Language-Learning Disorders?,” Language, Speech & Hearing Services in 
Schools; Rockville 30, no. 3 (July 1999): 266. 
69 Singer and Bashir, 266. 
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Working memory allows an individual to hold and manipulate information, and is 
limited in its capacity.70 Baddeley introduced a Working Memory Model that suggests 
working memory consists of four components. The four components are the central 
executive, phonological loop, visiospatial sketchpad, and episodic buffer.71 The model 
describes the phonological loop and the visiospatial sketchpad as the short-term store for 
holding auditory information and visual-spatial information, respectively. The episodic 
buffer serves as the short-term store between both long-term memory and working 
memory’s phonological loop and visiospatial sketchpad. The central executive function 
manages attention and coordinates activities between all the different components. 
Deeper level of analytical thinking requires a higher degree of resources to be directed to 
the central executive. Managing several tasks at once that are not intuitive can overload 
working memory since attentional resources must be devoted to each task.72 
During critical incidents, an individual’s working memory engages the same 
processes. Using an officer-involved shooting for example, the officer uses the 
visuospatial sketch pad when the officer sees the situation unfolding; the threat of a 
firearm for example. The visuospatial sketch pad is responsible for storing perceptual 
imagery momentarily for possible use by the central executive function.73 The 
phonological loop is responsible for momentarily storing audible information (threats) 
made by a citizen holding a deadly weapon, for example. The phonological loop can hold 
speech-based information for up to two seconds until working memory derives meaning 
from those words.74 While the officer is observing and hearing the actions and words of 
the citizen, the episodic buffer retrieves and holds relevant knowledge and past 
experiences from long-term memory that can be applied to the current situation. The 
episodic buffer stores relevant references or experiences temporarily. The central 
executive attempts to manage the situation by directing where attention is focused. The 
                                                 
70 Alan Baddeley, “Working Memory,” Science 255, no. 5044 (1992): 566. 
71 Baddeley, 567. 
72 Baddeley, 557. 
73 Baddeley, 559. 
74 Baddeley, 259. 
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central executive directs what information, stored temporarily either in the visuospatial 
sketch pad, phonological loop, or episodic buffer to pay attention to, and subsequently, is 
used when making decisions. Since cognitive resources are limited, non-threatening 
stimuli are ignored. The process where the central executive directs attention and 
resources is known as a top-down process. Also, a threshold can be reached at which the 
central executive becomes overwhelmed from too much stress that can create issues by 
distorting attention. Janis and Mann refer to this restriction of resources and loss of 
attention as hypervigilance, which results in reactionary decisions.75  
Shields, Sazma, and Yonelinas examined the overall effect of acute stress on 
memory. Their research supports the concepts that a manageable level of stress improves 
cognition. The purpose of this study was to examine how acute stress impaired the core 
cognitive functions of “working memory, inhibition and cognitive flexibility.”76 They 
found that acute stress affected working memory differently in individuals and that acute 
stress negatively impacted cognition in more ways than the injection of cortisol alone.77  
c. Memory 
The basic memory process has three phases: encoding, storage, and retrieval 
process.78 Encoding is a process to convert stimuli into information that individuals can 
use.79 The storage process files memories into the brain for later use. The types of 
memory consist of (a) episodic memory that is specific episodes or events, procedural 
memory, which is information on how to do things (repetition is a key), and (b) semantic 
                                                 
75 Janis and Mann, Decision Making, 50–51. 
76 Shields, Sazma, and Yonelinas, “The Effects of Acute Stress on Core Executive Functions,” 652. 
77 Shields, Sazma, and Yonelinas, 666. 
78 Baddeley, “Working Memory,” 556; Alan D. Baddeley, Michael Kopelman, and Barbara Wilson, 
eds., The Essential Handbook of Memory Disorders for Clinicians (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 
2004), 2. 
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memory that is generalized knowledge.80 The last step in memory is the retrieval of 
information.81 Retrieval is the process of recalling specific memory from storage and 
bringing it into working memory.82 Baddeley illustrates a human memory model in 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Model of Human Memory83 
                                                 
80 Baddeley, Kopelman, and Wilson, The Essential Handbook of Memory Disorders for Clinicians, 4. 
81 Baddeley, “Working Memory,” 556. 
82 Baddeley, Kopelman, and Wilson, The Essential Handbook of Memory Disorders for Clinicians, 2. 
83 Source: Baddeley, Kopelman, and Wilson, 2. 
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The levels of the processing model suggest that recalling information that has 
been rehearsed is easier than information that is not rehearsed due to a deeper level of 
encoding.84 It suggests two types of rehearsal, (a) maintenance, which is rehearsing 
information continuously, and (b) elaborate rehearsal, which is using mental techniques 
to make connections between ideas. The parallel distributed processing model suggests 
memories exist in networks.85 New experiences alter network relationships that change 
individuals’ knowledge base. The information processing model suggests that the brain 
recognizes cues from a situation that pass through sensory registers consisting of sight, 
sound, and touch. Those cues are processed by working memory where an executive 
controller determines what sensory register to devote attention to and retrieve information 
stored in long-term memory. According to literature, short-term memory lasts 18-
seconds. Studies indicate recall accuracy drops significantly over delays of 18 seconds 
without rehearsal.86 
Memory and perceptual distortion during critical incidents create issues of 
inaccurate recollections during follow-up investigations. Artwohl debriefed 157 officers 
involved in shootings and found that many of them were not fully aware of how 
inaccurate their memory and perceptual distortions of the incident were.87 An example of 
memory and perceptual distortion was illustrated during one of Artwohl’s interviews, 
when the officer said:  
I told the SWAT team the suspect was firing at me from down a long dark 
hallway about 40 feet long. When I went back to the scene the next day I 
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was shocked to discover he had actually been only about five feet in front 
of me in an open room. There was no hallway.88 
Rivard and colleagues conducted a study of 115 police officers for dissociation, 
acute stress, and posttraumatic stress related to shootings involved in deadly force 
confrontations.89 The study retrospectively surveyed officers for dissociative responses 
during their shooting. According to Rivard et al., 90 percent of the respondents indicated 
experiencing dissociation during the critical incident that can explain inconsistencies 
when recalling the incident. Additionally, 19 percent of the responses indicated varying 
forms of memory impairment for details of the shooting.  
Luethi explored the impact of stress on human memory to study the complex 
effects on different types of memory. Luethi evaluated working memory, explicit 
memory, and implicit memory for emotional threats. Luethi studied 35 adult males by 
assessing their cortisol levels during an experiment on stress.90 The experiment consisted 
of three parts: a 25-minute relaxation phase, a 25-minute social stressor phase, and a one-
hour memory-testing phase. During the relaxation phase, the subjects completed a socio 
demographic-questionnaire. For the social stressor, phase participants were subjected to 
the TSST as a simulated job interview. The TSST consisted of stress anticipation and 
mental arithmetic tasks performed in front of an audience.91 The explicit memory tests 
consisted of two standardized tests. The first explicit memory test presented subjects with 
20 German and Turkish words to memorize their translations.92 The second explicit 
memory test was a spatial memory test. The spatial memory test involved learning a route 
on a map.93 Working memory tests were conducted using a reading span task.94 The test 
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required participants to read sentences and determine whether they were trivial or not.95 
In addition, the subjects had to memorize the correct order and last word of each 
sentence.96 The study assessed priming, or influencing thoughts by activating associated 
ideas, in both the perceptual and contextual aspects.97 In this study, perceptual priming 
was induced by showing known objects before recognition tests to determine how 
performance was influenced. Reliance on intuitive processes was encouraged by applying 
time pressure during object recognition. Perceptual priming was assessed using 100-line 
drawings of easily identifiable objects by naming each object. If the subject inaccurately 
named the object, the object was shown as a more complete image. The level of picture 
fragmentation identified correctly by the subject was used to calculate priming. “Priming 
was calculated as the difference between the fragmentation levels at which old (i.e., 
previously seen) and new drawings were identified.”98 Ninety search displays presented 
in a “T” formation by a computer aided in measuring contextual priming. Each display 
had 12 colored patters in a small square made up of red, green, blue, and yellow items. 
The “T” formation was rotated with different orientation, spatial, and color 
configurations. “Subjects were instructed to indicate as quickly and accurately as possible 
the direction of the T-base” configuration.99 Contextual priming was assessed measuring 
the speed of their answers (i.e., reaction times).100 Luethi collected saliva after the 
relaxation phase as a baseline, again 15 minutes after the stress phase, and after the 
memory phase. Luethi’s results indicate a noticeable working memory reduction 
associated with stress while improving episodic memory. The study finds, “the degree of 
stress and the enhanced cortisol levels induced by experimental conditions were 
sufficient to impair working memory, enhance spatial episodic memory, and to facilitate 
classical conditioning for aversive stimuli” and “stress did not seem to negatively affect 
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hippocampal processing, as required for explicit memory and implicit memory tasks.”101 
The relevance of this research suggests that people naturally prefer simple memory 
responses during stressful situations to more thought-provoking responses.102  
B. EMOTIONAL AROUSAL: ANXIETY AND FEAR  
“Shots fired, we need help” screamed Sevier County Sheriff’s Deputy Justin 
Johnson over his police radio. A news report from the Knox News reported that Johnson 
was answering a call in a mobile home park and just finished chasing a subject through a 
field.103 After a short struggle with the female subject, Johnson sees a man on a patio of a 
nearby trailer holding what he perceives is a weapon in his hand. Johnson fires at the 
man, shooting four rounds towards a set of mobile homes, pauses, and fired three more 
rounds. Four minutes later Johnson is hyperventilating, holding his pistol in his hand, and 
retreating from the female subject still lying on the ground. Two paramedics on scene 
were detaining the female subject while Johnson was hyperventilating. Paramedic 
Michael O’Connor saw Johnson and said, “Pull it together. Look at me.” As Johnson 
continued to hyperventilate, O’Connor said, “Give me your gun. Let go of it,” as he 
wrestled the gun away from Johnson. “Easy, buddy. I got it under control. Calm down. 
It’s ok.” Johnson later wrote in his report that he had seen a second subject on the porch 
of a trailer pacing quickly back and forth. Johnson thought he heard the subject on the 
porch say he had a gun and thought he saw a gun in his hand. Johnson fired at him. The 
subject had a cellphone in his hand videotaping Johnson’s handling of the female suspect. 
The investigation revealed the man on the porch did not have a gun. Johnson’s emotional 
response to acute stress caused him to panic and hyperventilate, which led to an 
inaccurate assessment of the situation.  
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Literature describes the anxiety and fear responses as having similar emotional 
reactions during a threat and uses them interchangeably. Despite their similarities, small 
distinctions exist between them. The aim of this section is to compare the nuances of 
anxiety and fear, as they largely overlap.  
The definition of anxiety is a feeling or worry, nervousness, or unease that 
happens when individuals anticipate an uncertain threat or critical incident.104 
Researchers have also associated anxiety as a “readiness and preparation to deal with 
potentially negative events.”105 Negative events, or critical events, can initiate the stress 
response that can interfere with decision making and produce physiological responses.  
Beilock and Carr examined the effects of anxiety on working memory.106 The 
study analyzed relational patterns between performance under time pressure and working 
memory capacity. The groups were arranged into two groups separating those with the 
highest working memory from those with lower working memory. A main objective of 
the study was to determine what effect off-task thoughts caused by anxiety, which can 
interfere with attentional recourses needed for working memory, have on performance 
between high versus low working memory capacity individuals.107 The participants 
performed math problems under high-pressure and low-pressure conditions that were 
influenced by specific demands on working memory. Group 1 consisted of the higher 
working memory capacity group, as well as a strong desire to excel. A higher working 
memory allows individuals to manage and process more information in their heads than 
the average person. Group 2 consisted of participants with lower working memory 
capacities, with a desire to succeed, but not defined by their successes. Beilock and Carr 
wanted to determine if added pressure affected all the participants equally. They study 
                                                 
104 Scott O. Lilienfeld et al., “50 Differences That Make a Difference: A Compendium of Frequently 
Confused Term Pairs in Psychology,” Frontiers in Education 2 (July 2017): 3, https://doi.org/10.3389/ 
feduc.2017.00037. 
105 Nazanin Derakshan and Michael W. Eysenck, “Anxiety, Processing Efficiency, and Cognitive 
Performance: New Developments from Attentional Control Theory,” European Psychologist 14, no. 2 
(2009): 173, https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040.14.2.168. 
106 Sian L. Beilock and Thomas H. Carr, “When High-Powered People Fail: Working Memory and 
‘Choking Under Pressure’ in Math,” Psychological Science 16, no. 2 (2005): 101. 
107 Beilock and Carr, 101. 
 28 
found that time pressure affected the performance of participants with a higher working 
memory capacity and a higher desire to succeed.108 “Choking under pressure” in those 
with higher working memory capacities is associated with anxiety-driven off-task 
thoughts that cause lower performance than expected given their capabilities.109 Beilock 
and Carr suggest that participants with higher working memory use their working 
memory (analytical thinking) to answer math problems under no pressure situations.110 
She suggests that the participants in the lower working memory group use rules of thumb 
(intuitive thinking) to answer their questions rather than analytically working through the 
problem. They suggest that in high-pressure situations, the higher working memory group 
employ rules of thumb (intuitive thinking) rather than working through the problem 
(analytical thinking).111 Whereas, the lower working memory group employ the same 
strategy as they do under no pressure. This result, they suggest, explains why the higher 
than average working memory group’s scores dropped (to the performance level of low 
working memory capacity individuals) while the other group remained consistent.112  
According to Beilock and Carr, anxiety and pressure “create mental distraction 
that competes for and reduces working memory capacity that would otherwise be 
allocated to skill execution.”113 Anxiety uses attentional resources that leave less 
available working memory to the skills needed to solve the task by consuming mental 
resources with off-task thoughts. These off-task thoughts cause maladaptive thinking by 
over thinking or becoming consumed with how people are performing rather than on 
performing the task itself. The results of this research “carry significant implications for 
interpreting performance in high-pressure situations” like critical incidents.114 The study 
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recognizes individuals with high working memory capacity did not perform to the best of 
their abilities because attentional resources were redirected by off-task thoughts.  
Additionally, Berggren, Curtis, and Derakshan found that anxiety takes up 
cognitive resources and interferes with visual memory.115 Berggren, Curtis, and 
Derakshan provide evidence that highly anxious people have an “attentional bias” toward 
threatening stimuli and this attentional bias can consume cognitive resources needed for 
optimal performance, and therefore, may degrade performance on other tasks.116 Their 
study concluded that anxiety interferes with visual memory through threatening cues that 
force the subject to focus solely on the threat and impairs individuals’ ability to notice 
other factors and their surrounding environment. Berggren, Curtis, and Derakshan’s 
research concluded that anxiety and the threat of danger attracts attention even when the 
danger is irrelevant to the task. Neutral stimuli can be interpreted as threatening even 
when it is not. When the mindset expects a threat, and is presented with a neutral 
stimulus, the stimulus is perceived as a threat. 
Schwabe and Wolf examined the effects stress played on habit-forming behaviors 
in humans. The purpose of their study was to explore how stress affects learning and 
memory strategies in humans. The study consisted of spatial learning tasks allowing for 
stimulus-response learning in humans. Two groups consisting of 44 participants each had 
to locate an item in a virtual reality room. One group was subjected to the TSST to 
initiate a stress response.117 The other group did not participate in the experiment under 
stress. Schwabe and colleagues suggest, “prior stress facilitates the use of a dorsal 
striatum-dependent ‘habit’ learning strategy at the expense of a flexible, elaborated, 
‘cognitive’ way of learning based on medial temporal lobe structures.”118 They found 
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training creates habits, or automatic responses, to specific situations.119 Habitual 
behaviors originating from a foundation that includes stress mitigation techniques can 
reduce inappropriate responses to a situation during which individuals are experiencing 
tunnel vision and cognitive constriction.120  
Dickerson and Kemeny’s meta-analysis identified a distinction between anxiety 
and fear. Dickerson and Kemeny’s study examined acute stress and the cortisol response. 
This meta-analysis reviewed mostly salivary cortisol samples since it is released in 
response to stress and is a common measure of individuals’ stress response. This meta-
analysis was limited to studies using acute psychological stressors like public speaking, 
cognitive tasks, and exposure to noise. Their study found little change in cortisol levels 
for individuals anticipating a non-threatening emotional stressor caused by anxiety and 
concluded that anxiety does not initiate a stress response as much as an imminent threat 
(i.e., fear) does.121 Furthermore, Dickerson and Kemeny found that uncontrollable 
imminent threats elicited the greatest cortisol response.122 
Originating from innate survival instincts, fear also affects decision making 
during critical incidents. Some fear seems innate while other fear is conditioned or 
learned.123 LeDoux theorizes that emotions related to survival, such as fear, are common 
among all animals to unavoidable threats.124 Likewise, Lilienfeld found that while 
anxiety is linked to uncertain anticipated threats, fear is linked to certain and “largely 
unavoidable threat[s],” and initiates a stress response.125 Artwohl recognizes fear as a 
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survival response to a threat occurring in four dimensions: the physical, emotional, 
perceptual, and cognitive.126 The reaction to a threat is based on the perception of a 
stimulus or circumstance as dangerous and varies from person to person.127  
Lerner found that fear, like anxiety, can interfere with cognitive processes, 
including attention, memory, and judgment during imminent situations.128 Lerner defines 
fear using three conceptual themes: uncertainty, unpleasantness, and lack of situational 
control. Christensen, a recognized author and subject matter expert in police use of force, 
defines fear as emotional, physical, perceptual, and cognitive responses caused by an 
immediately dangerous situation. LeDoux, in contrast, explains that the feeling of fear is 
not the same thing as being able to detect and respond to threats. LeDoux explained that 
survival functions of fight, flight, or freeze exist to keep organisms living, not to create 
emotions of anxiety or fear.129 LeDoux explains the concept of fear as a cognitive process 
of awareness during a dangerous or threatening situation.130 He describes the feeling of 
fear a person experiences as the brain instinctively determining a threat or through 
experiences that form associations between a stimulus and an event.131  
The brain processes fear in several steps, which seem relevant in both the 
emotional response to fear and the stress response to fear. First, the brain detects a threat 
and its severity is based on prior training and experience. After the detection of a threat, it 
routes the information to the thalamus.132 Next, the thalamus routes the information to the 
                                                 
126 Alexis Artwohl, “Perceptual and Memory Distortions during Officer Involved Shootings,” 
(workshop, AELE Lethal & Less Lethal Force Workshop, June 2008), 19–1, http://www.aele.org/law/ 
2008FPJUN/wb-19.pdf. 
127 Christensen and Artwohl, Deadly Force Encounters, 60. 
128 Jennifer S. Lerner and Dacher Keltner, “Beyond Valence: Toward a Model of Emotion-Specific 
Influences on Judgement and Choice,” Cognition & Emotion 14, no. 4 (2000): 476, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
026999300402763. 
129 “Why You Might Be Scared of X,” YouTube video, 46:56, posted by Joseph LeDoux, July 22, 
2015, https://youtu.be/vbEUVC8OeCY. 
130 LeDoux, “Rethinking the Emotional Brain,” 655. 
131 LeDoux, 656. 
132 Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 43. 
 32 
amygdala and cortex.133 Also, at this point, an amygdala hijacking can occur if a threat 
emotionally overwhelms an individual.134 This phenomenon prioritizes cognitive 
resources towards emotional and threat related processing in areas, such as the amygdala; 
thereby, leaving little cognitive resources for executive functions needed for analytical 
reasoning and decision making. The amygdala initiates a search for relevant information 
in long-term memory that may be applicable to the present threat. 135 Once the amygdala 
confirms a threat, the hypothalamus initiates a release of catecholamines that trigger the 
fight, flight, or freeze response.136 The final step in the fear response process, according 
to Tsigos and Chrousos, is the secretion of the stress hormones adrenaline, noradrenaline, 
dopamine, and cortisol. The literature seems to indicate a correlation between the 
emotional reaction to fear and the body’s SAM response to acute stress. 
Being threatened starts an emotional response to fear, and biophysical stress 
response. The emotional arousal caused by anxiety closely resembles fear and are often 
intertwined. Fear initiates the SAM response, which produces catecholamines. These 
catecholamines prepare the body for survival while consuming executive resources 
needed for decision making. Processing the emotional and biophysical response during 
critical incidents can result in poor performance and poor decisions. 
C. SUMMARY 
Acute stress, fear, and anxiety affect cognitive resources on individuals’ 
physiological and cognitive processes that are needed in more deliberate decision-making 
processes. Stress affects cognitive resources and executive functioning.  
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Generally, both stress and emotional arousal inhibit cognitive resources by 
focusing on what is most important to survival.137 However, subtle distinctions exist 
between acute stress, fear, and anxiety. Fear is experienced in response to an imminent 
threat and initiates a stress response. Anxiety, on the other hand, anticipates a threat and 
usually does not initiate a stress response. Anxiety, however, can prime people to 
perceive a situation as threatening that thereby initiates the fear and stress response.  
In extreme conditions, cognitive restrictions induced by emotional arousal and 
acute stress can limit decision making to the point cognition is purely reactionary-based. 
As time pressure increases, and the opportunity for escape decreases, the likelihood of 
entering a panicked-like state increases. Janis and Mann refer to a panicked-like state as a 
state of hypervigilance that impairs the decision-making process. 
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III. THE EFFECTS OF ACUTE STRESS, ANXIETY, AND FEAR 
ON DECISION MAKING 
Most people do struggle in a use-of-force confrontation; police recruits and young 
officers are no different. Officers frequently enter situations with little knowledge of the 
people or conditions they will encounter and must respond to every situation with their 
best judgement, regardless of the effects of stress, anxiety, or fear. Throughout these 
encounters, they must remember their departmental policies, as well as state and federal 
laws. In reality, officers’ sensemaking processes, and rationalization of a given situation 
influence their decision making; the perception of a threat may prompt a state of 
hypervigilance where perception and decision making are affected. On the other hand, the 
perception of a threat overlaid with the awareness of public perception that necessary 
action may be misconstrued as excessive force can lead to underreacting to a threat. 
Stress, anxiety, and fear not only take their toll on the body but affect decision making as 
well.  
As previously stated, law enforcement uses the term hypervigilance in its training 
and operations to describe awareness of a potentially dangerous situation. Janis and 
Mann, on the other hand, describe hypervigilance as a state of panic that often results in 
regrettable decision making.138 This discrepancy, between law enforcement’s use of the 
terminology and the scholars’ definition, may suggest a mischaracterization of 
hypervigilance in applied contexts.  
Law enforcement’s current use of the term is more reflective of vigilance. David 
Barlow describes vigilance as identifying the next potential threat to human survival.139 
Vigilance may be advantageous in situations requiring critical performance, whereas 
hypervigilance is mostly synonymous with panic, which can be detrimental to 
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performance and decision making. An understanding of hypervigilance and its effects are 
critical in split-second life or death situations, which may lead to hasty decision making 
and unintentional officer-involved shootings. Appreciation for hypervigilance and the 
contexts under which it occurs is the first step in learning how to develop techniques and 
training that prevent tragedies.  
Hypervigilance is commonly seen during acute stress situations, such as police-
involved shootings, major disturbance calls, or responses to mass shootings. For example, 
hypervigilance may have led to the unintentional discharge of a pistol instead of a Taser 
in the Mehserle shooting, as described in Chapter I.140 Martinelli, a forensic criminologist 
specializing in force, testified in court that hypervigilance caused Mehserle’s confusion 
between his Taser and pistol. In another example, as described by the Washington Post, a 
sheriff’s deputy stood outside a school during a 2018 school shooting. Deputy Peterson, 
one of the first responding deputies on scene, ordered responding officers to remain 
outside the school as 19-year-old Nikolas Cruz killed several students inside classrooms. 
Deputy Peterson made these decisions knowing entering the school while Cruz was 
actively killing students inside could jeopardize his own life. Deputy Peterson was 
experiencing acute stress during his decision to wait outside rather than enter the school, 
which could be the result of a reactionary decision based on the stress response initiated 
by the perceived life-ending threat. Deputy Peterson’s active-shooter directives state that 
responding officers “may enter the area and/or structure to preserve life.”141 In the latter 
example, the school shooting resulted in the deaths of 17 people. These examples 
highlight inadequate performance from officers that can arise out of hypervigilance in 
contexts characterized by threats that induce anxiety, fear, and acute stress.  
This chapter begins by discussing a dual decision-making process and then 
applies it to differences in decision-making processes between vigilance and 
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hypervigilance.142 After a discussion on the dual decision-making process, the 
relationships among hypervigilance, acute stress, and emotions are discussed. Finally, 
this chapter concludes with an analysis of Janis and Mann’s hypervigilance definition that 
highlights the benefits of vigilance against the pitfalls of hypervigilance in law 
enforcement.  
A. DUAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
Daniel Kahneman, a Princeton University psychologist who was awarded the 
Nobel Prize, is known for his research on judgement and decision making.143 Kahneman 
describes a decision-making process that consists of two systems. System 1 is fast and 
intuitive while System 2 is slow and deliberate.144 As the default system, System 1 makes 
intuitive judgments based on previous experience and knowledge.145 System 2 is a 
deliberate thinking process involving the prefrontal cortex. Kahneman explains that 
understanding performance, specifically in decision making, involves studying 
individuals’ abilities to override System 1 with System 2.146 Kahneman’s dual decision-
making model suggests one of two pathways: 
1. An intuitive judgment or intention is initiated and 
a. endorsed by System 2, 
b. adjusted (insufficiently) for other features that are recognized as 
relevant, 
c. corrected (sometimes overcorrected) for an explicitly recognized 
bias, or 
d. identified as violating a subjectively valid rule and blocked from 
overt expression. 
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2. No intuitive response comes to mind and the judgment is computed by 
System 2.147 
Kahneman suggests one of the key functions of System 2 is to oversee and 
override System 1 thinking (i.e., intuitive thinking) when an error based on the intuitive 
response is likely.148 However, engaging in System 2 thinking requires effort, and is 
therefore, mostly avoided. Kahneman expands on this concept by stating, “many people 
are overconfident, prone to place too much faith in their intuitions” and suggests 
cognitive effort requires work, so it is avoided as much as possible.149 The amygdala is 
associated with more intuitive thinking processes in response to fear as a survival 
response. Kahneman illustrates this concept using an example of a math puzzle often 
answered with intuition, not analytical thinking. 
A bat and ball cost $1.10. 
The bat costs one dollar more than the ball. 
How much does the ball cost?150 
The intuitive answer, $.10, and is wrong. System 2 does not override System 1 
because confidence is so high, based on how easily the answer came to mind that it 
results in overconfidence in the initial answer. Analytical thinking most likely concludes 
that the ball is $.05 because the bat is a $1.00 more than the ball. Kahneman explains 
that, “If the ball costs $.10, then the total cost will be $1.20 ($.10 for the ball and $1.10 
for the bat), not $1.10.”151 Overconfidence in initial intuitive responses plays a huge role 
in relying on System 1 thinking without analytical engagement, as illustrated by the bat 
and ball question.152 Overconfidence is overestimating what people believe they know, 
while underestimating what they are ignorant of and what part chance has in 
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circumstances.153 Furthermore, Kahneman explains intuition as recognition of, “a cue, 
this cue has given [the] expert access to information stored in memory, and the 
information provides the answer. Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than 
recognition.”154 Expertise and training serve as the foundation of a magical performance 
(a sixth sense), which is nothing more than an ability to recognize subtle signs and 
insight. 
The dual decision-making construct is shared among other psychologists.155 In a 
meta-analysis of brain networks in response to acute stress, Hermans et al. reviewed 
animal and human studies to examine how acute stress reallocates cognitive resources 
from analytical thinking (executive control network) to intuition (salience network).156 
Hermans et al. propose that excessive stress and moderate acute stress cause “a dynamic 
reallocation of cognitive resources to systems responsible for attentional vigilance 
(salience network) from the executive control network.”157 They found that excessive 
stress interferes with attention and cognition, which results in slower information 
retrieval from memory and decision-making impairment. Hermans et al.’s intuitive 
(salience network) theory aligns with Kahneman’s System 1. Hermans et al.’s analytical 
(executive control network) theory aligns with Kahneman’s System 2.  
Hermans et al. refer to the SAM and HPA, reviewed previously in Chapter II, in 
relation to how they affect the two separate networks, executive control and salience. The 
first wave of hormones is released instantly into the body after a perceived threat and 
lasts up to 60 minutes, and then cognition is shifted from the executive control network to 
the salience network. Attention is oriented in a bottom-up process, whereby the most 
salient threats receive attention that enable individuals to detect threats rapidly, respond 
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adequately, and prepare for future threats.158 A second wave of hormones activates the 
HPA axis with the production of cortisol. The long-term effects of cortisol, known as the 
genomic effects of cortisol, are not realized for at least an hour after the stress response 
and last several hours.159  
According to Hermans et al., “the early phase of the acute stress response triggers 
a sensory hypervigilant state accompanied by an increased reliance on rapid, but more 
rigid, stimulus-response behaviors.”160 In other words, stress primes the salience network 
for responding to threats in an intuitive, habit-based manner. The more salient a threat is, 
the more it captures individuals’ attention and influences behavior. Selective attention to 
a threat in police work can mean the difference between life and death. Police recruit 
training may, by extension, be unintentionally priming the body for intuitive or System 1 
thinking, which relies more on the salience network for responding.161 Recruits are taught 
to constantly scan for threating cues that threaten their survival. Selective attention to 
threatening cues speeds up threat identification and reduces officers’ reaction time, which 
prepares their bodies for survivability.162 Anxious people may recognize danger quicker 
by shifting their attentional bias to a threat at a higher proportion than non-anxious 
individuals.163 Anxious people may also misinterpret neutral stimuli as threatening, who 
may thus misread a situation. 
B. HOW ACUTE STRESS AND EMOTIONS AFFECT DECISION MAKING  
Vigilance stems from awareness of the environment in anticipation of a threat that 
has yet to happen. The amount of attention individuals devote to a threat determines the 
level of vigilance. If the attention placed on a potential threat is too low, individuals may 
be subject to complacency and caught off guard by the threat. As discussed in Chapter II, 
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when awareness to a threat increases, physiological processes in the brain automatically 
focus on important or threatening queues.164  
Understanding the effects of acute stress on decision making and performance 
during critical incidents is vital to understanding hypervigilance. The effects of stress can 
alter peoples’ perception of a situation, the intensity of cognitive recourses dedicated to a 
threat, and the risks, if any, they may take to resolve the threatening situation safely. 
Although the biophysical stress response caused by fear and anxiety is similar for most 
individuals, everyone processes a stressor differently since degrees and intensities vary 
from person to person.165 Several factors, such as training, experience, genetics, and 
proficiency, can influence the degree to which the stress response affects individuals. 
Nevertheless, when emotional and biophysical intensity reach a certain threshold, the 
cognitive resources needed for deliberative thinking are scarcer, overconfidence causes a 
reliance on intuitive thinking, and a state of hypervigilance can contribute to hasty 
decision making.166  
The amount of time individuals experience stress influences their performance. 
According to controlled studies, prolonged stress during incidents degrades decision 
making and results in more risky decisions.167 The longer officers experience life-
threatening situations, the more likely they are to take risks that provide a way out of 
their situations, even at the cost of making undesirable decisions. In addition, research 
shows that suspense narrows attention. The longer officers are engaged in life-threatening 
situations, the greater the attention-narrowing effects. Prior experience and training may 
not mitigate the attention-narrowing effects.168 The effects of stressor intensity, 
attentional control, tunnel vision, tunnel hearing, and distortion of time influence officers’ 
decision-making abilities. Attention-narrowing can play a role in intentional blindness. 
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Mack explains the concept of inattentional blindness as a phenomenon caused by an 
inability to perceive a stimulus because they were focused on something else.169 
As described by Janis and Mann, once individuals begin to feel time-pressure and 
perceive their chances for survival are decreasing, they start to panic for a way out of the 
situation. When people begin to panic, their comprehension of the situation declines 
because they no longer fully understand the situation. Individuals tend to make decisions 
based on intuitive thinking because it is quick and easy. Nevertheless, once individuals 
process information based on their emotions, it is difficult to change their thought 
processes to slower, more thorough analytical processes. The inability to understand and 
process a life-threatening situation fully causes individuals to make impulsive decisions 
to ensure their survival. Janis and Mann propose, “when people are warned about 
oncoming danger that will materialize within a very short time interval, their fear mounts 
to such a high level and they act so inappropriately that they would be better off with no 
warning at all.”170 They support their argument with evidence from tornado responses 
where limited forewarning of the oncoming disaster ended in higher death and injury 
rates.171 Janis and Mann agreed that, “people who had only brief forewarning took action 
with a protective intent, but...the actions taken may have actually increased their danger 
or they may have been caught unprotected during the process of taking [inappropriate] 
protective action.”172 They conclude that people with brief forewarnings performed 
worse than those given no forewarning at all.173 Challenging Janis and Mann’s model, 
stress alone, without time pressure, has been found to affect scanning patterns adversely 
even when no time constraints are present.174 Keinan suggests that familiarity with the 
problem can improve the scanning of choices, which can lead to better solutions. On the 
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other hand, familiarity can bias scanning patterns and perception when considering 
alternatives in the decision-making process.175 Familiarity can act as a hindrance when 
officers are presented with a neutral cue (e.g., cell phone) but because of expectations of 
a threatening cue (e.g., gun), the officer perceives the cue as a threat. Applying this 
concept to training may suggest that suboptimal training can lead officers into a false 
sense of confidence; going into a situation that seems familiar based on overgeneralized 
training, but in reality, is different and requires unbiased scanning and perception to 
understand the scene adequately.  
As with most situations in law enforcement, critical incidents usually catch police 
officers off guard. Rarely are police officers given any forewarning of peoples’ intention 
to harm them. The lack of forewarning causes some officers to start at a disadvantage 
since the luxury of time to reason through a good decision is not usually an option. Lack 
of time, or time pressure, causes an accelerated decision-making process that excludes 
non-threatening cues and requires less cognitive effort to adapt to the situation.176 A 
breakdown in cognition caused from an increased emotional and biophysical intensity 
contributes to poor performance. A transition to the intuitive system of thinking may 
explain the disparity between individuals’ anticipated reaction and their hastily executed 
actions in life-threatening incidents. The results of such a disparity may be disastrous.  
C. VIGILANCE AND HYPERVIGILANCE: THE PHENOMENON 
Few scholars have examined hypervigilance. Janis and Mann have written the 
most research on the phenomenon of hypervigilance. According to Janis and Mann, 
vigilance, occurs when “the decision-maker searches painstakingly for relevant 
information, assimilates information in an unbiased manner and appraises alternatives 
carefully before making a choice.”177 Hypervigilance, in contrast, occurs when a “hasty, 
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disorganized and incomplete evaluation of information leads to faulty decisions and post-
decisional regret.”178 Their work examines hypervigilance as it pertains to catastrophic 
disasters with warning of the impending event. The context in which they studied 
hypervigilance, although different from police work, is still relevant since both situations 
pertain to acute stress and potential loss of life. However, an important difference existed 
in applying their work to police work in that critical incidents that trained officers 
encounter often occur with no warning. The remainder of this chapter focuses on decision 
making during critical incidents. The chapter examines Janis and Mann’s emergency 
decision-making model, including hypervigilance. The final section in the chapter 
examines critical incidents without any warning.  
Janis and Mann explore the concept of emergency decision making based on the 
psychological stress response. The emergency decision-making model uses assumptions 
based on field studies and experiments on which testable predictions can be made.179 
Janis and Mann start with a detailed description of hypervigilance: 
The state of hypervigilance, which in its most extreme form is called 
panic, arises when time is short for escaping from oncoming threat. A 
person in this state experiences so much cognitive constriction and 
preservation that his thought processes are disrupted. The person’s 
immediate memory span is reduced and his thinking becomes more 
simplistic in that he cannot deal conceptually with as many categories as 
when he is in a less aroused state.180 
Their research on hypervigilance focuses on emotional arousal, initiated by an 
emergency warning of an imminent disaster situation, its effects on decision making, 
judgment, and individuals’ actions.181 Emotional arousal initiated by the warning of an 
oncoming emergency also starts a stress response, intertwining emotional, and stress 
responses. Janis and Mann define psychological stress as “a generic term to designate 
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unpleasant emotional states evoked by threatening environmental events or stimuli.”182 
Janis and Mann suggest emotional arousal initiated during critical situations impairs 
thinking when compared to routine decision making of everyday life.183  
Janis and Mann’s hypervigilance research focused on peoples’ abilities to make 
decisions during impending life-threatening situations.184 They analyzed individuals’ 
decision-making performances when escaping from a disaster after being given warnings. 
Janis and Mann delve into four main variables of hypervigilance: (a) seriousness of risk 
to the individuals confronted with a decision, (b) seriousness of risk if a response to the 
threat is taken, (c) realistic hope to find a more appropriate means to escape a disaster, 
and (d) time to search for and scrutinize all possible escape options available.185 A 
positive correlation between time pressure and hypervigilance exists. The greater the time 
pressure, the higher the intensity of hypervigilance experienced by individuals.  
Janis and Mann’s conflict theory model is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Conflict Theory Model186 
The theory suggests five possible scenarios are associated with psychological 
stress and decisional conflict:  
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1. The degree of stress generated by any decisional conflict is a direct 
function of the goal strivings that the decision makers expect to remain 
unsatisfied: the more goals expected to be unfulfilled and the more 
important the needs to which those goals correspond, the greater the stress.  
2. When people encounter new threats or opportunities that motivate them to 
consider a new course of action, the degree of decisional stress is a 
function of the degree to which they are committed to adhere to their 
present courses of action.  
3. When decisional conflict is severe because each alternative poses a threat 
of serous risks, the loss of hope about finding a better solution than the 
least objectionable one will lead to defensive avoidance of threat cues.  
4. In a severe decisional conflict, when threat cues are salient and the 
decision makers anticipate having insufficient time to find an adequate 
means of escaping serious losses, their levels of stress remain extremely 
high and the likelihood increases that their dominant patterns of response 
will be hypervigilance.  
5. A moderate degree of stress in response to a challenging threat induces a 
vigilant effort to scrutinize the alternative courses of action carefully and 
to work out a good solution, provided the decision makers expect to find a 
satisfactory way to resolve the decisional dilemma.187  
This model indicates individuals’ response for a pattern of awareness of a threat 
in relation to the amount of time used with the possibility of a successful escape from the 
perceived threat (hope). Janis and Mann found that a threatening situation starts a 
cognitive process that accesses the memory for adequate ways to deal with a threat.188 
Janis and Mann’s findings describe the effects of hypervigilance as cognitive congestion 
and simplistic thinking, which are similar to Hermans et al.’s reliance on salience 
network and Kahneman’s System 1 thinking experienced during acute stress.  
Keinan tested Janis and Mann’s model of decision making under stress to 
determine if vigilance allows sound and rational judgment. Keinan assessed whether 
deficient decision making resulted from a failure to consider all relevant alternatives 
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systematically.189 Specifically, it was tested whether hypervigilance replaces vigilance 
under severe stress. Keinan suggests three ways decision making breaks down under 
stress:  
1. Premature closure: decision making without considering all the 
alternatives  
2. Nonsystematic scanning: a panic-like state, searching for a frantic way out 
of a dilemma without shifting between alternatives  
3. Temporal narrowing: with insufficient time, impulsively seizing a solution 
that seems to promise immediate relief190  
Keinan tested Janis and Mann’s hypervigilance theory by studying a group of 100 
college students under stress manipulation by administering an anxiety inventory. The 
procedure consisted of three conditions: uncontrollable stress, controllable stress, and no 
stress. Under each stress condition, the participants answered 50 questions at a computer 
terminal. To manipulate uncontrollable stress, electrodes were applied to the participants, 
and they were told an electric shock, although harmless, could be given during the 
experiment.191 The uncontrollable stress consisted of the threat of the electrical shock that 
might have occurred at any time during the study.192 The controllable-stress procedure 
mirrored the uncontrollable-stress condition except that the participants’ performance 
determined when they received a shock.193 Participants subjected to no-stress were not 
exposed to the threat of electrical shock or attached to electrodes during participant 
questioning. All students solved logical analogies on a computer terminal while they 
were measured in the four areas. The first measure scored the number of questions the 
participants answered without reviewing alternative answers. The second score measured 
non-systematic scanning. Temporal narrowing and correct answers were scored as the 
third and fourth measurements, respectively. Keinan’s study suggested stress had an 
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effect on the decision maker’s scanning patterns and choices available to them.194 
Additionally, the study suggested that stress impairment occurred even without time 
constraints.195  
Weymar et al. tested the relationship between fear, vigilance, and stress levels. 
Weymar et al. manipulated stress using the CPT. The purpose of exposing the test group 
to stress is to test whether stress will increase awareness of negative images quicker than 
an individual in a control group who is not in a stressful state. The design of this 
physiological stressor causes the similar biological changes to the body as experienced 
during an acute stress response, such as increased blood pressure, increased heart rate, 
and increased cortisol concentration.196 They showed 100 images―50 neutral and 50 
unpleasant images―to 40 male participants assigned to either the stress or the non-stress 
condition. The non-stress control group placed their hands in warm water before viewing 
the same images to mirror the stress groups’ procedures. The participants showed a more 
heightened awareness of the negative images in the stressed (cold water) condition. This 
finding suggests, “that acute stress sensitizes the brain for increased processing of 
harmful cues in the environment.”197 The Weymar et al. study is significant since it 
describes vigilance as a relationship between acute stress and awareness of threatening 
cues in the environment.198 The study suggests, “that stress enhances the hypervigilance 
toward external threat cues, hereby enhancing the (amygdala-mediated) elaborated 
perceptual processing in the extra striate visual cortex.199 Acute stress, in conjunction 
with unpleasant images, receives more resources and attention than pleasant images.  
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Janis and Mann’s study of disaster response found that people panic when they 
believe they are in imminent danger and feel their only opportunity to escape will soon 
disappear. They found that people who experience hypervigilance have a sense of 
urgency that they need to act immediately. As a result of their impulsive need to act, the 
individuals fail to consider all their options. Janis and Mann suggest that individuals’ 
panicky searches for a solution and limited options create hasty decisions that seems to 
provide an instant solution.200 Once removed from the situation, the individuals realize 
their decisions may not have been the best option available.201 Largely responsible for 
Janis and Mann’s theory is a pattern of awareness of a perceived threat. Janis and Mann 
suggest that some stress is necessary to incite vigilance, so that people are able to 
challenge a threat and scrutinize options carefully; therefore, elevated stress and 
awareness may inspire high-quality solutions to resolve a critical situation.202 The 
conflict theory model suggests that a moderate degree of stress creates vigilance, which 
analyzes every resource and works out an appropriate course of action to resolve the 
quandary. When a threat is not imminent, vigilance is a state of awareness likely to lead 
to successful alternatives. When a threat is imminent, on the other hand, hypervigilance is 
an elevated state of awareness likely to lead to hasty decisions without considering 
alternatives. 
D. HYPERVIGILANCE IN POLICE ENCOUNTERS 
A recent incident of a police officer killing an unarmed citizen occurred on March 
18, 2018, in Sacramento, California. A citizen observed someone vandalizing cars and 
called 911. When officers confronted the subject, Stephon Clark, he began to run on foot 
from them. He ran through peoples’ yards, jumped fences, and stopped in his 
grandmother’s backyard, where officers confronted the subject. When officers perceived 
Clark had lunged at them with a weapon in his hand, one officer―who thought his life 
was in danger―yelled, “Gun!” Police officers fired 20 shots at Clark. He was shot eight 
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times, seven of which entered through Clark’s back. Clark’s body fell lifeless to the 
ground. The video seems to show the moment officers transitioned from vigilant to 
hypervigilant. The officers’ hasty decision to provide immediate relief from a deadly 
force encounter occurs when they thought their lives were threatened. Officers 
instinctively defended themselves from a perceived threat of a gun and reacted the way 
they were trained. An investigation revealed a cellphone next to Clark’s body but no 
weapon. Fatalities and the emotional toll of such shootings on citizens and police officers 
substantiate the need to study hypervigilance in police work.  
This officer-involved shooting illustrates a difference between vigilance and 
hypervigilance. Vigilance, as described by Janis and Mann, results in good decision 
making that explores every option for the best possible solution. Vigilance results in 
awareness to a threat where the possibility of a safe outcome and time favor the 
individuals.203  
Vigilance is an awareness of the possibility of a threatening situation, which 
prompts individuals to prepare to deal with a possible threat.204 Individuals who 
experience vigilance are more controlled, and therefore, are more likely to make an 
appropriate decision when handling a threat. Planning and mental-preparation decrease 
the likelihood individuals may transition to hypervigilance. Predetermining the best 
course of action for survival in a life-threatening incident results in the least negative 
consequences for all individuals involved. Put differently, planning affords individuals 
the opportunity to think through worst-case scenarios in a controlled environment before 
experiencing the event in real life. Training engrains a habitual course of action given 
certain scenarios.205 The benefits of vigilance erode with a perceived inability to 
successful resolve a threating situation. A lack of preparation can add to that perception 
and cause a panic-like state of hypervigilance. 
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Hypervigilance occurs when individuals experience panic upon encountering a 
threat that they are not prepared to handle.206 A lack of preparation creates an 
overwhelming feeling when individuals are caught by surprise. Individuals, without 
planning, must recognize they are in a critical situation, think through a proper solution to 
the situation, and implement the solution all while they are experiencing it. As time 
passes without a practical solution, the individuals start to experience hopelessness, 
which added to their stress. Cognitive restriction, attention-narrowing, and reactionary 
decision making caused by hypervigilance may result in improper or frantic solutions to 
escape a life-threatening situation.207  
E. SUMMARY 
Hypervigilance is commonly accepted among professionals as a form of 
awareness without a formal definition.208 Hypervigilance can be conceptualized by 
individuals’ stress reaction, interactions with the environment, ability to evaluate a 
situation, and resolve the situation safely.209 Moderate stress, on the other hand, is 
beneficial to a point, and serves as the basis of vigilance. Once stress crosses a maximum 
threshold, the effects of stress degrade performance and decision making. Individuals 
entering a state of hypervigilance begin to focus on a successful conclusion to the 
incident while trying to mitigate both emotional responses and the biophysical effects of 
a stress response. Biophysical effects on the body limit attention, long-term memory 
recall, and restrict a deeper thinking process. 
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IV. TRAINING AND INTUITION 
Rarely does analytical thinking happen during a crisis; therefore, most decisions 
are based on intuition. While Chapter III presented how decision making usually happens 
during a crisis, Chapter IV discusses recommendations on how to train recruits better in 
how to make better intuitive decisions under stress. There is no substitution for 
experience, but training most closely approximates experience for new officers, so they 
may start building the foundation for their eventual expertise. Optimal intuitive decisions 
begin with good training that embeds the right kind of instincts into individuals, and 
overrides the instincts that lead to bad decisions. Through training that features repeated 
exposure to high-stress situations, officers start to build expertise and prepare for worst-
case scenarios. This expertise, built from cognitive conditioning through exposure 
training, may enable intuitive decision making grounded in relevant experience and 
expertise. Cognitive conditioning through an awareness of officers’ stress responses can 
shape an automated response (intuitive) based on officers’ higher skill levels (expertise). 
The more officers make decisions during stressful environments, the more familiar they 
become with their decision-making process and performance during a crisis (expertise) 
until they do it without deliberately thinking (intuitively).210 Research on expertise-based 
intuition serves as the foundation for cognitive conditioning through officers’ awareness 
to stress. Salas and colleagues define expertise-based intuition as, “The intuitions 
occurring at these later stages of development where the decision maker has developed a 
deep and rich knowledge base from extensive experience within a domain.”211 Salas and 
colleagues use a Venn diagram to illustrate the relationship between intuition and 
expertise to form expertise-based intuition, seen in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Venn Diagram Depicting the Overlap and Distinction 
between the Constructs of Intuition and Expertise212 
The ability to make optimal intuitive decisions, along with the familiarity with high-stress 
contexts, may subsequently make an officer less susceptible to hypervigilance.  
Officers who receive inadequate training often exhibit overconfidence, a 
susceptibility to hypervigilance, a tendency toward reactionary decision making, and an 
inability to engage analytical thinking. By not including stress recognition and mitigation 
exposure during worst-case scenario training, the current nationwide law enforcement-
training curricula leave officers ill-prepared for the possible mental and biophysical 
responses encountered during a critical incident. Repetition in training alone may result 
in recruits being overconfident in their abilities. Repetition leads to a reactionary 
response without adequately understanding a situation. Cognitive training in how to 
function in high-stress environments helps to mitigate the reactions based on repetition 
without thinking first. Kahneman suggests the illusion of understanding “is [that] we 
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believe we understand the past, which implies that the future also should be knowable, 
but in fact we understand the past less than we believe we do.”213 This concept seems 
relevant to law enforcement since training bolsters this illusion because officer training 
does not include functioning in high-stress environments, which results in overconfidence 
that the training they received has adequately prepared them for real-world encounters. 
This overconfidence can lead to hypervigilance and reactionary decisions without 
realizing the consequences of how a stress response’s effects overrides optimal decisions. 
Optimal training curricula that integrate recognition of how the body responds 
during stress may bridge the gap between rote training and understanding the appropriate 
context in high-stress situations, which can lead to better intuitive decisions by learning 
how to overcome stress reactions during critical incidents. This chapter proposes a 
refocusing of police training that incorporates cognitive conditioning through exposure to 
stress and emotional reactions during worst-case training scenarios. The benefits of 
refocusing police training this way may reduce susceptibility to hypervigilance and allow 
for more optimal decision making.  
A. INTUITION 
Since stress reduces the capacity for analytical thinking during critical incidents, 
improving intuitive decision making in training is critical. Analytical reasoning is 
constrained because of stress, which creates a reliance on intuitive judgement. Intuitive 
decision making is commonly attributed to expertise among police officers who survive 
life and death situations, and it is most often referred to as a “gut feeling” or a sixth 
sense.214 Intuitive decision making comes to mind with little if any cognitive effort. 
According to Kahneman, the human ability to avoid mistakes hinges on whether 
analytical thinking corrects faulty intuitive thinking.215 Experience, expertise, and 
training accumulate as a mental catalog full of references for officers to fall back on 
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during crisis decision making so that intuitive thinking is less likely to be faulty in these 
situations.216 This intuition starts with awareness of signs of potential danger. However, 
no formal police instruction on intuition or knowledge is gained through experience, and 
experts often have a hard time pinpointing why first responders made the decisions they 
did.  
Anchors and priming are two constructs that influence intuitive decision making. 
The anchoring effect is a heuristic based on initial information that people received and 
then rely too heavily upon during the decision-making process.217 The priming effect, 
according to Kahneman, is “the influencing of an action by the idea.”218 Law 
enforcement training serves as both an anchor to and primer for officers’ intuitive 
responses since training automates a skill that requires less cognitive effort and analytical 
thinking.219  
Perception and awareness serves as the foundation for intuition during a critical 
incident. Kahneman suggests that, in analytical thinking, individuals may know 
something to be factual, but their intuition perceives the information differently.220 He 
illustrates this difference between analytical knowing and intuition’s perception with the 
following Muller-Lyer line illusion of two lines in Figure 5: 
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Figure 5. Muller-Lyer Line Illusion221 
Peoples’ intuition perceives the second line as longer. Few people would engage more 
analytical thinking, which would lead them to stop to measure the lines to validate their 
intuition. Critical incidents lack the time needed to validate intuition. This misperception 
in real-life creates an inability to comprehend a situation fully with information that does 
not accurately reflect a situation. Kahneman also noted that analytical thinking requires 
much more effort and is avoided when possible, which makes optimal intuitive decisions 
important.222 The inability to process information analytically during a crisis impedes the 
ability to understand the current situation. The induction of a stress response and change 
in thinking when people are emotionally aroused can interfere with sensemaking, or how 
a given situation is interpreted.223 Individuals’ experiences are not defined by an 
objective reality; rather, individuals’ experiences are defined by how reality is perceived. 
The narrowing of attention and perceptional biases are two separate but related constructs 
that result in difficulty distinguishing between the perception of reality and what is 
actually happening.224 In other words, devoting all the attention on a specific task, like a 
threat, can lead to being blind to anything else.225 Priming, anchoring, perception, and 
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narrowing of attention are cognitive constructs that work together to form intuitive 
decisions.  
When encountering a critical incident, people process information through 
working memory.226 Working memory pulls information from relevant experiences 
stored in long-term memory. Under the best conditions, the mind detects, codes, and 
stores information as a series of images.227 Under the worst conditions, stress 
overwhelms working memory, restricts cognitive resources, and interferes with attention, 
which can result in reactionary decisions.228 Baddeley illustrates the human memory 
model in Figure 2 and suggests recalling well-rehearsed information, like rote training, is 
easier to recall because of a deeper level of encoding.229 
Further convoluting the intuition of an experience, acute stress impedes executive 
functions, analytical thinking, and memory recall.230 Once individuals experience a life-
threatening situation and start to rely on the intuitive system for thinking, rarely do they 
revert back to the analytical way of thinking.231 If the individuals are ill-prepared for the 
situation, their emotional state can become overwhelming. Hence, law enforcement needs 
enhanced intuitive decision-making training; training that incorporates stress awareness 
and recognition.  
B. MODERN DAY TRAINING ENVIRONMENT 
Most recruit training begins at the police academy, which operates Monday 
through Friday, 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. The Dallas Police Academy, for instance, is a 36-week 
long program, which does not house its recruits. The academy is broken down into four 
focus areas: academics, physical fitness training, defensive-tactics training, and worst-
case training. The academic portion of the academy consists of learning local, state, and 
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federal statutes, crime prevention models, community awareness training, and other 
theories relevant to law enforcement. Physical fitness training and defensive-tactics 
training incorporate proper nutritional education with a rigorous physical regime and the 
latest self-defense techniques. About halfway through the training regimen, a robust 
worst-case training program integrates theoretical knowledge learned during the 
academic portion of the academy into a controlled, simulated reality. Worst-case 
scenarios afford recruits simulations to test tactical and theoretical aspects of training. 
Worst-case scenarios recreate real world, high-stress situations in a controlled training 
environment. After graduating from the police academy, recruit officers continue their 
education under the supervision of an experienced officer during field training. On-the-
job field training is the ultimate worst-case training with one exception; field training 
cannot be controlled like a worst-case training scenario.  
A typical day for a recruit at the beginning of the academy starts with eight hours 
in the classroom learning theory and memorizing law. As the recruits’ training cycle 
progresses, they receive less theoretical material and more worst-case application., The 
recruits’ day transitions to a mix of half lectures and half-practical worst-case scenarios 
made up of physical fitness, defensive tactics, or worst-case training in the middle of the 
training program. Near the end of the academy, the recruits spend most of their time in 
practical scenarios and put theory into action. Simulated family disturbance calls, active 
school-shooting responses, and vehicle pursuits are a few examples of worst-case 
scenarios. 
Current law enforcement training presents some theoretical material without 
integrating it into practical worst-case scenarios for a higher level of learning. Every 
academic setting starts at the lowest level by introducing theories and facts relevant to 
their profession. For example, police recruits must familiarize themselves with the 
Constitution, as well as state and local laws to be effective in their jobs. The intent of the 
academy is to foster a learning environment that encourages officers’ higher levels of 
thinking by incorporating theories into practical scenarios rather than just remembering 
facts. As the recruits progress through the academy, the theoretical knowledge they learn 
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at the beginning of the process is progressively integrated into worst-case training 
scenarios.  
A major shortcoming in current law enforcement training is its ineffective 
integration of stress management theories and techniques during worst-case scenario 
training. The Texas Commission on Law Enforcement (TCOLE) licenses police officers 
in Texas and sets statewide training curricula. The mandated curricula for statewide 
police academies require a 618-hour basic police officer course for licensing a recruit, as 
shown in Figure 6. TCOLE mandates a series of stress management courses totaling 14 
hours of fitness and wellness, and a stress management training course.232 Put into 
perspective, the effects of stress during a critical incident, which can lead to 
hypervigilance, and possibly, the unnecessary loss of life represents only 2.3 percent of 
TCOLE-mandated training time. Furthermore, TCOLE mandates that 16.8 percent of 
training time focusing on force options, mechanics of arrest, and firearms training, and 
15.8 percent of training time focusing on the social aspects of community policing. 
TCOLE mandated material should refocus on the effects of stress on decision making 
during critical incidents, in addition to the aftermath that results from it. Not only would a 
greater focus on stress management help officers’ wellness, it would potentially save 
lives. 
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Figure 6. TCOLE 618-Hour Basic Police Officer Course233 
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TCOLE mandates stress recognition classes without taking these skills to a higher 
level of learning. Nevertheless, TCOLE’s training mandates are no different than the rest 
of the country when it comes to their reliance—or overreliance—on force options in the 
academy. This conceptual overreliance on force is discussed in greater detail as how 
inadequate training leads to overconfidence in peoples’ abilities. Two case studies, one 
from the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) on de-escalation and one from the 
Dallas Police Department’s (DPD’s) internal force reports, are discussed later in this 
chapter to illustrate how training curricula frame police officers’ decision making during 
critical incidents.  
1. Repetition without Repeated Exposure 
Police academies recognize that rote training leads to automated reactions and try 
to capitalize on this aspect as much as possible. In fact, recruit officers learning new 
defensive tactics, firearm skills, or driving techniques practice a new skill over and over. 
Not only are recruits told to practice the skill during training; they are also required to 
rehearse techniques in their mind at home. Recruit are told to dry fire their weapons at 
home by firing an unloaded weapon to engrain the mechanics of shooting to ensure they 
have a proper grip, sight picture, and trigger pull. Recruit training incorporates 
shoot/don’t shoot scenarios that use a modified firearm and simulated munitions, or 
ballistically sound structures to provide realistic training and dynamic scenarios. Even 
though this training is needed to get used to using a gun when needed, it is not 
appropriate in all circumstances. Current training lacks incorporating repeated exposure 
in high-stress critical incidents in addition to repetition training so the officers can 
maintain situational awareness while also being well-trained in weapons use. This type of 
training is critical to decreasing the susceptibility towards hypervigilance that would lead 
to mindless reactions based on rote training instead of decisions based in an accurate 
assessment of context. 
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Training can automate a skill, so that execution of that skill becomes more 
intuitive.234 The more recruits practice a task successfully, the easier that task becomes. 
For example, when teenagers first learn to drive a vehicle, their analytical thought 
processes needs to be engaged to coordinate all the functions necessary to drive 
successfully and safely. New drivers must remember to drive on the right side of the 
road, leave enough space between vehicles to serve as a reactionary gap, scan the 
roadway, and remember traffic laws. As the teenagers drive more often, the driving 
process moves from an analytical thought process to an intuitive one through repetition. 
After several years of driving, the processes becomes so automated that they can arrive at 
a routine destination, such as work or home, and have no memory of driving their usual 
route unless an unusual event happens, such as a near accident. 
Other professions, such as those in the airline industry, professional sports 
organizations, and martial arts, use repetition to develop a skill into expertise. The airline 
profession attributes its safety record to intuitive responses made by pilots that they 
acquired during training and their expertise through experience.235 In an examination of 
existing research, one study suggested the key to pilot safety is to overtrain.236 Pilots 
attribute habits and conditional responses reinforced during training with flight simulators 
to resolving real-life emergencies successfully.237 Flight simulator trainings induce more 
than just rote training; simulators induce anxiety, fear, and a stress response. “Deliberate 
practice tends to aid performance by automating it, enhancing the performer’s ability to 
use pattern matching and improving the accuracy of his perceptions and expectations,” 
according to McKinney and Davis.238 Police officers and pilots are similar in many 
aspects. Both professions require hours of training to master their craft. Both professions 
require split-second decisions in ever-changing situations happening under extreme 
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pressure. Both professions have an obligation to prepare their personnel for what they 
will face while doing their duties, including the biophysical aspects of their job. This 
preparation starts with similar training that works together to create knowledge, which is 
more than just rote training.239 
Training provides expertise, or references to fall back on, through repeated 
exposure of relevant situations, and not just rote training.240 Training creates a schema by 
integrating knowledge and grouping like concepts together using prior knowledge and 
experiences to integrate new knowledge into memory.241 Training also assists in creating 
a schema, which facilitates the understanding of new information.242  
2. Intuition Starts with Awareness 
Law enforcement teaches the theoretical aspects of awareness for a survival 
mindset. This survival mindset serves as the foundation to recognize a potential threat to 
officers’ safety instinctually. New officers learn that intuition starts with awareness and 
feedback during high-pressure situations. Current law enforcement training does not 
integrate its theory into practice, which inhibits a higher level of thinking. Higher order 
thinking, on the other hand, would incorporate recognition and continuous feedback into 
a controlled training environment to reinforce learned theoretical knowledge. 
Police training has adopted Colonel Jeff Cooper’s combat mindset, which 
includes four states of awareness. His awareness levels provide a framework as a 
reference to recruits. As described in the introduction, Cooper’s four states of awareness 
are as follows: 
1. White: officers are unprepared to take lethal action. 
2. Yellow: officers understand their lives may be in danger and [they] may 
have to act if circumstances warrant. 
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3. Orange: officers have identified specific adversaries and are prepared to 
act for their survival. The orange awareness state does not warrant lethal 
force. 
4. Red: lethal force is warranted and the officers will shoot if circumstances 
warrant.243 
Cooper suggests the right mindset is the most important thing for surviving a deadly force 
encounter. The color codes are a means of setting officers’ mindset to prepare for a force 
encounter.244 This model provides a reference for officers to understand what level of 
awareness they should devote to survival while patrolling their beat. 
Police officers train to work in the yellow survival mindset and to always be 
prepared to defend their own lives or the lives of innocent citizens. However, a 
continuously elevated state of awareness is impractical.245 Officers cannot constantly 
question the safety of their situations. That type of emotional paranoia would likely 
interfere with both the analytical and the intuitive thinking processes.246 A red state of 
awareness, for example, is resistance that involves active aggression with the potential of 
a deadly force encounter. A red state of awareness is most likely to activate a 
hypervigilant state. A red state of awareness is synonymous to an acute stress response 
that usually results in an inability to recognize all available options.247  
Recruits also receive training on how to reevaluate feedback from situational 
awareness continuously for better decision making. This training incorporates a form of 
situational awareness that frequently reevaluates individuals’ changing reality to slow 
down the decision-making process. The observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop 
framework teaches new recruits a mental process to reevaluate constant feedback during 
a dynamic situation. U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd developed the OODA loop for 
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fighter pilots during combat missions to slow down observation and decision making.248 
The OODA loop concept starts with being observant. After observing their situation, the 
next step is to orient themselves to it. Several things influence peoples’ ability to orient to 
the situation, including prior training, experiences, and genetics.249 Next, they decide on 
an action and execute a response. The entire process depends on feedback (awareness) 
received during the observation, orientation, and action process. Feedback obtained 
during the OODA loop can start the decision-making process over again. Reality can be 
so multifaceted that equally valid explanations from differing viewpoints can appear 
unpredictable during a crisis. The OODA loop attempts to understand an ever-changing 
situation fully to resolve these perspectives.  
Research and experience teach officers the importance of slowing down situations 
for improved decision making during a crisis. Recruits view videos of real-life incidents 
where officers rush into situations blindly, which usually result in catastrophic 
consequences. Rather than rushing into a situation, recruits learn the principles of gaining 
distance from the subject and placing a barrier between the suspect and themselves, 
which in theory, affords more time to make better decisions. In 2016, PERF assembled 
200 police chiefs, federal partners, and mental health experts in Washington, DC to 
discuss strategies to reduce police force in situations that did not involve suspects with 
firearms. The discussion focused on better decision-making strategies by slowing the 
momentum of police encounters. The outcome of the conference was the Use-of-Force 
Guiding Principles that outlines 30 “industry standard” concepts. PERF recognizes law 
enforcement needs to challenge the conventional thinking on use of force.250 The 
research forum suggests a need to refocus law enforcement training on law enforcement’s 
fundamentals of training, tactics, and equipment regarding its use of force.251 PERF’s 
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research is focused on officers’ responses to people with mental illness during non-gun 
incidents. The PERF committee admits: 
In situations where there was a threat, officers were immediately closing 
the gap and engaging very quickly without any structured thought or 
process about what they were doing. And the resulting outcomes were 
messy… Some were going beyond what was proportionate and engaging 
in physical violence, leading to them being charged with criminal 
offenses.252 
However, law enforcement made some progress to reduce hasty decisions but the steps 
are not significant since they lack stress awareness.  
PERF’s research suggests two main findings. First, law enforcement curricula 
should reinforce slowing officers’ responses to improve decision making. Second, PERF 
suggests law enforcement curricula should expand their efforts on how police officers 
make decisions when responding to a citizen experiencing a mental illness crisis. When 
officer rush into a crisis and execute an action without fully understanding the situation, 
their actions are usually an innate response to protect themselves. In reality, the officers’ 
situations may not be as they perceive it to be and can result in unintended consequences. 
PERF’s second finding, while on the right track of understating crisis decision making, 
misses the aim of correcting the underlying issues of officers’ overconfidence in crisis 
decision making created during their training. PERF’s recommendations should focus on 
understanding how officers should react when they experience a stress response during 
critical incident decision making since the only thing officers can control is their actions, 
not the actions of a citizen. This fundamental flaw contributes to continued inappropriate 
repetition during training that can lead to overconfidence in abilities or an 
overgeneralization of one type of response during all critical incidents, and not just 
incidents involving mental illness during non-gun incidents.  
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3. Worst-Case Scenarios
Good police training pushes recruits to find their limit by using worst-case 
scenario training. Shoot/don’t shoot scenarios offer recruits an opportunity to learn from 
their failures while reinforcing successful behaviors. When done well, training makes 
tasks easier and prepares officers to make quick and effective decisions in crucial 
situations. Law enforcement also uses realistic operational environments to mirror worst-
case scenarios and to practice skills and proficiencies in a controlled environment.  
Nevertheless, increased violence against officers has transformed the law 
enforcement training mindset from defensive to more aggressive. Recruits now train and 
use advanced tactics and intimidating ballistic protection, such as heavy vests, helmets, 
armored vehicles, and assault rifles to defend themselves against active-shooter 
situations, unprovoked attacks, and ambush situations. The advanced tactics and 
protection integrated into training have increased the officers’ aggressive combat 
mindsets needed to survive violent encounters. This movement has been referred to as the 
militarization of law enforcement. A police academy’s dilemma is how to offset a combat 
mindset with a guardian heart. A warrior mindset suggests police officers are at war with 
this nation’s citizens, whereas a guardian mindset suggests police officers serve and 
protect U.S. citizens.  
Training police recruits to operate in an elevated sense of awareness all the time 
would be physically and mentally exhausting, not to mention detrimental to their 
health.253 Critics say law enforcement working in a constant state of vigilance and 
shoot/don’t shoot training contributes to avoidable shootings and deaths. According to a 
National Public Radio news article, training companies like Calibre Press show videos of 
police officers being surprised or caught off guard by suspects to reinforce the need for 
the militarization of police training.254 The article discusses the Castile shooting, stating 
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that Yanez attended Caliber Press’s class in 2014 called “The Bulletproof Mind” to 
support its point.255 Further contributing to the idea that police militarization went too far, 
President Obama banned sales of some military equipment for law enforcement after 
receiving criticism for a paramilitary-like response during riots following police 
shootings. The President’s criticism came after Michael Brown, who was unarmed, was 
killed by police officers in Ferguson, Missouri. President Obama banned armored 
vehicles, weapons, some less-than-lethal weapons, and ammunition in 2015. Obama said, 
“We’re going to prohibit some equipment made for the battlefield that is not appropriate 
for local police departments…There’s other equipment that may be needed in certain 
cases, but only with proper training.”256 
During worst-case scenario training, recruits can expect to strap on battle gear, 
protective vests, throat protection, and a full-shield facemask. The recruits use their 
assigned firearms, with interchangeable barrels that allow .7mm cartridges, which are 
less-lethal marking projectiles. The recruits enter a wide variety of scenarios to reinforce 
a skill previously taught. The recruits can encounter an armed subject, armed with the 
same type of firearm and simunitions, or observe a subject acting intoxicated. The 
situation is as dynamic as real life and creates a stress response. Each situation is set out 
to reinforce specific training objectives; from an active shooter situation to answering a 
domestic disturbance. Instructors stand alongside the recruits every step of the way and 
feed them information as the scenario plays out. These instructions, along with the 
recruits’ observations, help prime them to recall information from previous lessons 
learned to end the scenario successfully. Blanks fired from a pistol, fire alarms, simulated 
police radio transmissions, and fake injuries afford recruits endless situations to induce a 
stress response limited only to a trainer’s imagination.  
Some worst-case training scenarios are designed to induce a stress response from 
their onset. Hands-on defensive tactics training, for example, initiates the fight, flight, or 
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freeze response when a simulated suspect attempts to take a recruit’s weapon during a 
physical altercation. Officer-down and ambush training requires officers to “square-up” 
to an armed suspect, step over a downed officer, square the recruit’s chest and body 
armor toward the suspect, and then engage the suspect. Yet training academies miss the 
mark of integrating theoretical aspects of stress exposure during stress-induced training. 
Training academies focus on officer tactics; and only officer tactics. Recruits finish the 
academy with a sense of confidence that they are prepared for any situation because of 
their tactical training. A simple modification to this process by including repeated 
exposure to stress to understand the stress response would prove invaluable to both the 
officers and citizens. 
4. Overconfidence 
Existing law enforcement training can create overconfidence, which instills too 
much faith in peoples’ intuition, especially if the training inadequately prepares the 
officers for real world situations.257 Said differently, overconfidence is fed by the 
misleading certainty of training.258  
The current training curricula are doing officers a disservice by not preparing 
them adequately to handle stress in critical incidents when they know the recruits will 
experience this stress shortly after they are released from the academy to real-life 
situations. Again, one of the major failures of current law enforcement training is that it 
creates automatic responses in recruits through repetition without an understanding of the 
situation. Referring to the financial community, Kahneman describes this condition 
eloquently:  
The illusion of validity and skill are supported by a powerful professional 
culture. We know that people can maintain an unshakable faith in any 
proposition, however absurd, when they are sustained by a community of 
like-minded believers. Given the professional culture. . . , it is not 
surprising that large numbers of individuals in that world believe 
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themselves to be among the chosen few who can do what they believe 
others cannot.259 
Kahneman suggests that mistakes are likely to happen in some situations.260 Furthermore, 
the pride that people have in their abilities and their unfamiliarity with their inabilities in 
combination with dynamic situations contribute to a false sense of security.261 
Contributing to Kahneman’s argument, Kruger and Dunning also studied the concept of 
overconfidence. Kruger and Dunning’s research summarized the phenomenon of 
overconfidence as a cognitive bias in individuals’ superior abilities, inaccurately 
recognizing their inadequacies as being greater than their abilities really are: 
People tend to hold overly optimistic and miscalibrated view[s] about 
themselves. . . . Those with limited knowledge in a domain suffer a dual 
burden: Not only do they reach mistaken conclusion and make regrettable 
errors, but their incompetence robs them of the ability to realize it.262 
The police culture reflects what and how it is trained. Training primes officers’ 
thinking by setting up a framework for their responses during an incident.263 PERF has 
studied law enforcement training and found it is too heavily focused on force options.264 
PERF’s research shows that the majority of recruit training involves firearms, defensive 
tactics training, and use-of-force scenario training. PERF’s study also finds that training 
in de-escalation and crisis intervention techniques have lagged considerably, as shown by 
the minimal training time spent on these skills. Figure 7 illustrates disproportionate 
training hours focused on force issues compared to de-escalation or crisis intervention. 
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Figure 7. PERF Recruit Training Hours by Topic265 
PERF found that officers do what they have been trained: 
It is unfair to blame individual police officers for using force in the ways 
they have been trained to use it. Our research revealed major shortcomings 
in the training that most officers currently receive. For example, a 2015 
nationwide survey of PERF members found that recruit officers in 
responding agencies receive substantial training on firearms and defensive 
tactics, which is appropriate given the firearms threats that officers in the 
United States face. However, officers receive considerably less training on 
subjects such as de-escalation, crisis intervention, tactical 
communications, and less-lethal options.266 
Dallas Police Chief David Brown understood that officers emulate their training 
philosophies and established new training protocols for the DPD in 2013. Brown’s 
emphasis focused on a reformation aimed at reducing unnecessary deadly force after 
Dallas officers killed an unarmed man.267 Brown mandated additional worst-case de-
escalation training and increased deadly force training for his officers at the Academy. 
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Brown’s efforts were followed by a drastic decrease in excessive force complaints filed 
against Dallas officers by its citizens, which he credits to his training mandates.268 
Gathering data from internal DPD statistics, the 2016 Internal Affairs Yearly Summary 
reports for the department indicated 716,001 “public contacts” for that year consisting of 
87,166 traffic contacts with 628,835 calls for service.269 The DPD’s 2016 Response to 
Resistance Report indicates of 1,666-documented responses to resistance incidents, only 
.23 percent of public contacts used force greater than handcuffing; handcuffing is a 
reportable use of force according to the DPD’s policy.270 The U.S. Census Bureau 
reported an estimated population for the City of Dallas, as of July 1, 2016, as 
1,317,929.271 The chance of a citizen in Dallas being involved in a reportable incident of 
excessive force is .12 percent. The DPD’s 2016 Response to Resistance Report shows 
53,148 arrests in 2016, which account for most of the instances where force is used 
against Dallas citizens.272 The percentage of reportable force used by DPD officers in 
arrest situations rises only to 3.14 percent. With the Internal Affairs Division reporting 
only 21 inappropriate force complaints in 2016, only .039 percent of arrests resulted in 
response to resistance instances, and of the 1,666 response to resistance incidents, only 
1.26 percent of those resulted in inappropriate force complaints.273 This data suggests that 
officers’ use of force reflected Brown’s de-escalation training philosophy and supports 
PERF’s findings that officers’ use of force reflects departmental training philosophies. 
An organizational training philosophy lays the foundation for recruits’ training, and a 
belief they are adequately prepared for every situation they may encounter. This illusion 
of confidence in their skills leaves them ill-equipped and overconfident in their abilities.  
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These studies show that officers reflect what they are trained in, whether it be 
substantial force training or in de-escalation techniques. However, training can create a 
bias that leads to a false sense of confidence, based on similarity, experience, and 
expedience.274 Officers who associate an experience with a training scenario may execute 
a response that they learned during training without realizing subtle nuances in the 
situation or recognizing the biophysical stress response they are experiencing. Intuition 
based on repetition without stress exposure creates a familiarity and an overconfidence 
that is dangerous and leads police officers to make hasty decisions.275 Cognitive ease, as 
illustrated by the bat and ball math problem, creates an unwillingness to override intuitive 
thinking with analytical thinking.276 The same concepts apply during a situation where 
overconfident officers instinctively trust their intuition. The current law enforcement-
training curricula fail to address these well-documented facts while exposing recruit 
officers to stress-induced scenarios through repetition without cognitive conditioning 
through exposure training, which increases the susceptibility of hypervigilance.  
C. OPTIMAL INTUITIVE TRAINING CURRICULA 
Law enforcement training has several optimal training concepts, but misses the 
mark of being exemplary. It currently incorporates repetition during worst-case training 
scenarios to create an automated response. A transitional progress occurs from pure rote 
memorization of theories that turns into practical applications using worst-case scenario 
training. Training curricula influence officers’ thinking and responses in critical incidents 
to mirror worst-case scenario training.277 Yet, a major drawback to current law 
enforcement training is not devoting training to stress recognition and mitigation through 
appropriate cognitive conditioning through exposure training. Stress mitigation and 
recognition techniques should be taught to recruit officers early in their training programs 
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and can benefit them for life. Effective stress recognition and management helps make 
decision making less susceptible to the effects of hypervigilance; thereby, enabling them 
to make better decisions. Analytical thinking may not engage during a critical incident, 
but optimal stress exposure allows officers to be more prepared to handle the situation. 
Fourteen hours of fitness and wellness, and stress management training mandated by 
TCOLE are likely not enough time to engrain a new skill into an expertise. TCOLE’s 
mandates, rather, focus on 104 hours of force related subjects. Thinking errors caused by 
recruits’ overconfidence in their abilities to resolve a situation with force results in 
TCOLE mandated community engagement training. TCOLE mandates 98 hours of 
community engagement training to ease the public’s negative perception of excessive 
force after law enforcement kills an unarmed citizen. As illustrated by PERF’s research, 
recruit officers regularly emulate their training. Moreover, the training curricula set the 
framework for what a recruit emulates since the curricula create expertise through the 
repetition of police tactics, and not repeated exposure. TCOLE needs to refocus its 
curricula to include stress awareness and cognitive conditioning through exposure 
training during worst-case scenarios in an effort to increase the ability to make better 
decisions, as well as to reduce the susceptibility of hypervigilance during critical 
incidents.  
Cognitive conditioning through exposure training that includes stress mitigation 
and recognition during worst-case scenarios paralleling the current training curricula is 
straightforward and relatively inexpensive. First, effective training curricula start with 
focusing priorities driven by academia, not by public or media perception. Then, the 
curricula must provide knowledge of stress and emotional recognition, management and 
mindfulness that eventually transform into a deeper comprehension. This knowledge 
should continue being reinforced during the academic setting. The missing step in current 
law enforcement training is applying stress and emotional recognition and mindfulness 
training repetitively during worst-case scenario exposure training, not just automating 
police tactics through repetition. Making stress and emotional recognition, management, 
and mindfulness exposure during worst-case scenarios a priority will allow the recruits to 
identify and analyze patterns within their own behavior that can reduce the negative 
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effects of stress to allow them to reduce their susceptibility to hypervigilance during 
critical incidents.  
1. Refocusing Police Training to Integrate Academic Research  
The law enforcement profession panders to public perception and the media. 
People tend to relate the importance of an issue with the extent of media coverage it 
gets.278 Media headlines portray a stereotype that male police officers kill unarmed 
citizens, but it may be more of a consequence from inadequate law enforcement training. 
Legislation mandates TCOLE include cultural awareness sensitivity and de-escalation 
training to resolve these issues. TCOLE has mandated additional crisis intervention, 
racial profiling, cultural diversity, and de-escalation techniques, and limiting the use of 
force in public intervention during the 2018 legislative session.279 TCOLE seems to be 
treating the symptoms of stress induced decision making to appease the media rather than 
attacking the problem at its root cause; that of the officers’ stress conditioned reactions 
during critical incidents.  
The paradigm of police officers’ excessive force is shifting to factors, such as age, 
education, training, and experience on the job, rather than other factors.280 Officer-
involved shooting statistics indicate age and education may play a part in high-profile 
police-involved killings. The statistics show that a large number of officers involved in 
high-profile police-involved killings are 35 years old or younger. Darren Wilson, 28, 
killed Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. Daniel Pantaleo, 29, killed Eric Garner in New York 
City. Timothy Loehmann, 26, killed Tamir Rice in Cleveland. Peter Liang, 27, killed 
Akai Gurley in New York City. These examples are just a few of the high-profile police-
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involved shootings where the officers were 30 years old or younger.281 Older officers are 
less likely to be involved in shootings than their younger colleagues.282 As officers gain 
more seniority, their likelihood of being involved in critical incidents decreases. Older 
officers’ experience, stress inoculation, and continual training contribute to an expertise 
resulting in improved decision making during critical incidents.  
McElvain and Kposowa, from Loma Linda University and University of 
California, respectively, conducted a study of police officer characteristics and the 
likelihood of using deadly force. This study, unlike most previous studies, focused on 
deadly-force encounters only. Data collected from the Riverside County Sheriff’s 
Department in California was examined for the purpose of this study. This study 
reviewed all officer-involved shootings for a 15-year span, from 1990 through 2004. 
Officers’ demographic information for both groups, obtained through personnel files, 
were used for comparison purposes. Demographic information consisted of gender, race, 
education, age, rank, and whether the officers experienced a prior shooting.283 The 
statistics for the variables of this study are summarized in Table 1. The statistics indicate 
almost 98 percent of the officers involved in shootings were male, less than 25 percent of 
officer-involved shootings were minorities, and officers with only a high school diploma 
comprised more than 75 percent of the shootings.284 The average age of the officers 
involved in shootings for this study was younger than 34.5 years old, with 78 percent of 
the sampling with the rank of deputy.285 College-educated officers use less force than 
colleagues without formal education according to the study.286  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Covariates287 
 
 
In a separate study, Aamodt’s findings regarding the correlation between 
education and force were similar. Aamodt said, “Better-educated officers perform better 
in the academy…are assaulted less often, [and] use force less often . . . than their less 
educated counterparts.”288 Aamodt found a positive correlation between education, 
training, and critical incident decision making and the organizational policy, supervision, 
and philosophy on the use of force issues.289 According to Aamodt, lax supervision or a 
philosophy that does not value human life transfers to the front-line officers. Officers 
reflect the values of their leaders and department, which are engrained in them during 
academic police training.  
Synthesis of these studies, including PERF and DPD’s use of force reports, 
suggest that officers with a higher education translate knowledge of theories and concepts 
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taught in the academy into a higher level of knowledge. Refocusing TCOLE mandated 
courses to recruit officers with a higher level of education to perfect intuition can lessen 
the susceptibility of hypervigilance.  
2. Training to Perfect Intuition 
Businesses are paying attention to stress reduction through training, and law 
enforcement should too. Large organizations, like Google, Nike, the U.S. military, and 
Apple, are capitalizing on the benefits of meditation to reduce stress, reduce healthcare 
needs, and improve decision making and performance.290 Recognition of the stress state, 
through meditation, is credited with improving performance and memory and can 
increase the brain’s gray matter.291 Reflection can regulate mood states and emotions and 
reduce stress, depression, and anxiety.292 Meditation, in concert with aerobic exercise, is 
credited with profoundly improving cognitive performance.293 Meditation enhances the 
cognitive capacity critical for decision making that teaches people to filter out unrelated 
thoughts due to anxiety, and therefore, frees attentional resources to focus on the situation 
at hand.294 Recognition provides skills to reduce stress effects for officers to perform 
before, during, and after critical incidents.  
The research literature is not lacking concerning the negative consequences of 
decision making under stress; however, current law enforcement training lacks 
preparation for the physiological responses that officers will encounter during stress. Law 
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enforcement training integrates skills needed for physical survival and physical fitness 
training while lacking the most important training, training for the mind and how to 
control emotional and stress reactions. Physical training and repeated exposure automate 
tasks to require less cognitive effort, which reduces the reliance on analytical thinking.295 
This concept heightens mental preparation through meditation and recognition before and 
after stress-induced training so the mind can anticipate its biophysical responses. Staal 
found that mental training can build a strong foundation of expertise to minimize the 
effects of acute stress, fear, and anxiety responses in the same fashion that skills-based 
training automates physical responses.296 Maintaining awareness and increasing decision 
making during heightened stress through cognitive conditioning during exposure training, 
while reducing the effects of stress, reduces susceptibility to hypervigilance by allowing 
officers the ability to control attention and focus it where it belongs.297  
3. Intuition and Exposure Training  
Acquiring a well-engrained skill takes more than just training; it takes 
consistency, intense focus, and pushing people to the edge of their abilities.298 Quality 
and effective training are more important than the act of training alone. In fact, training 
that reinforces an incorrect skill or task is worse than not training at all, since training and 
habits go hand-in-hand.299 Training should start slowly to build coordination and a solid 
foundation for a particular skill. As the skill develops, the speed of repeated exposure 
should gradually increase. Once a skill is fully grasped, training can be reinforced by 
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imagining and rehearsing it vividly in the brain.300 Integrating stress and emotional 
exposure training into training iterations should follow the same concept. 
Traditional law enforcement training reflects the status quo of the military, but 
without the aim of optimal intuitive training through continuous stress recognition and 
exposure. Lieutenant General Robert B. Brown has recognized that, “Legacy training 
methodologies and capabilities do not replicate the complexities or challenges they 
[who?] encountered during a decade of conflict.” 301 Brown continues, “Our Soldiers and 
leaders realize the environment they will encounter in future combat is growing in 
complexity and unknowns, and they are demanding realism in training.”302 Blascovich 
defines an immersive virtual environment (IVE) as a simulator that “create[s] a 
psychological state in which the individual perceives himself or herself as existing within 
the cockpit of an aircraft.”303 The Army defines realistic training as, “the deliberate 
practice of individual and collective tasks to enable tactical and technical proficiency that 
support mission accomplishment in a training environment that approximates the 
operational environment in both sufficient complexity and substance.”304 Law 
enforcement is adopting worst-case scenario training to enable trainees to experience a 
mental rehearsal and experience a psychological state while in a controlled 
environment.305 These concepts must be reinforced in a controlled exposure-based 
training environment. 
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4. Recognition and Mindfulness Training 
Optimal curricula for recruits should include cognitive conditioning in the form of 
meditation and stress recognition at the beginning of their academic program, which then 
transforms their learned theory into higher knowledge throughout practical worst-case 
scenarios. The course should include simple techniques, like controlled breathing with 
cognitive control, relaxation, and non-responsive attitudes have been shown to improve 
selective attention, improve performance, and decision making.306 Continuous 
reinforcement and cognitive conditioning through exposure training throughout the 
recruits’ learning can easily be incorporated in the recruits’ worst-case scenario training.  
As previously stated, meditation is credited with stress reduction and improving 
performance, memory, and increasing the brain’s gray matter.307 Mindfulness can 
regulate mood states and emotions, and reduce stress, depression, and anxiety.308 
Recognition, in concert with aerobic exercise, has been credited with profoundly 
improving cognitive performance.309 After all, meditation is free, can be done anywhere, 
and requires little effort once it becomes a habit.  
The first step in reducing the effects of a physiological response during stress-
induced training is to recognize its effects. Officers experience stress in different 
manners. One officer may experience tunnel vision and the perception of slow motion 
while another officer’s perception is just the opposite. Being able to pinpoint the effects 
of stress and recognize what stimuli trigger it starts with recognition during reflection in 
meditation. Training that allows officers to practice breathing techniques during the onset 
of a stress reaction in worst-case training scenarios can slow a situation down in real-life. 
Slowing a situation down allows for additional time to contemplate more choices to make 
better decisions.  
                                                 
306 Moore et al., “Regular, Brief Mindfulness Meditation Practice Improves Electrophysiological 
Markers of Attentional Control,” 12. 
307 Hölzel et al., “Mindfulness Practice Leads to Increases in Regional Brain Gray Matter Density,” 
38–41. 
308 Hölzel et al., 36–38. 
309 Alderman et al., “MAP Training,” 7–8. 
 83 
After recognizing the individual effects of stress, tailoring mental preparation and 
reflection before and after officers’ worst-case training scenarios recognizes their stress 
responses while critiquing their decision making. Sensors on officers can capture 
physiological reactions during stress-induced training to aid in recognition. Sensors are 
increasing in popularity; the Apple iWatch, for example, collects some of this 
information already. Data collected from sensors measuring blood pressure, pulse, heart 
rate, and breathing can further aid in future partnerships between psychologists and law 
enforcement trainers to reduce hypervigilance.  
Finally, after recognizing how stress affects officers, they can integrate lessons 
learned to harness the positive effects of stress and improve intuitive decision making. 
Increased strength, additional energy, and motivation are some examples of the positive 
effects of stress.310 Meditation prior to and immediately after worst-case training can 
expose the effects of stress experienced during the scenario and allow the officers to 
reflect on specific stimuli that trigger their biophysical responses. The scenario can be 
reenacted, while the officers focus on recognizing and correcting adverse responses of 
stress specific to themselves. Breathing techniques employed by the officers during a 
scenario, for example, can slow heart rate, lower blood pressure, and slow respiration. 
Breathing and scanning a situation by physically moving the eyes back and forth can 
reduce the effects of tunnel vision. Repeated exposure of the scenario, in combination 
with meditation and stress recognition between intervals, can work in concert to reduce 
cognitive resources needed for decision making. Replicating the current training process 
continuously can fill the gap between recruits’ lack of experience and expertise while 
reducing hypervigilance. Replacing pure repetition with cognitive conditioning through 
exposure training transforms a higher level of learning by not just understanding stress, 
but effectively applying and evaluating it. This thesis suggests that stress awareness and 
cognitive conditioning through exposure training can reduce bias, reduce hasty decisions, 
and improve scanning of available choices during critical incidents. Adequately 
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understanding and responding during a stress response is necessary to reduce 
hypervigilance. 
D. IDEAL DECISION MAKING 
So what does ideal decision making look like during a critical incident? Optimally 
trained recruits recognize that judgments and decisions that are intuitively based on 
expertise are quite helpful; however, in critical incidents that present surprising or 
unfamiliar stimuli, recruits need to refrain from automated responses that lack an 
understanding of the situation. Optimally trained recruits recognize that an expert may 
apply a response influenced by the closest experience they have encountered, but it is 
inappropriate in their current situation because of a slight nuance in the situation. 
Practicing meditation and mindfulness training to reduce the negative effects of stress can 
help mitigate these errors. 
A real-life example of an optimal critical decision happened when a fire 
commander ordered his firefighters out of a burning building within seconds of the floor 
collapsing.311 As the fire commander was battling the blaze, he felt an uneasy feeling; his 
intuition told him something was wrong. He ordered his men outside within seconds of 
the floor giving way. Unknown to the fire commander, the fire started in the basement, 
and not in front of him where he could see the fire. When asked why the fire commander 
made his decision, he replied that he had “a sixth sense.”312 When the researcher (Klein) 
pushed the fire commanders for deeper reasoning, a discussion between the researcher 
and the fire commanders ensued: 
The commanders said [fire fighting] is just a matter of following routine 
procedures,” Klein continues. “So I asked to see the book in which all of 
those procedures were codified. And they looked at me as if I was nuts. 
They said, ‘Nothing’s written down. You just learn through experience.313 
                                                 




Recruits endure the same phenomenon of experience as intuition. Trusting your “gut 
instincts” starts with awareness and the ability to understand, not just see, what is going 
on around you. As in the example with the fire commander, police officers perceive 
incoming stimuli in situations that are interpreted through their previous experiences and 
expectations, which then leads to an intuitive judgment about the situation.314 In high-risk 
situations, these decisions are increasingly likely to be hasty decisions that are made 
without considering every available alternative. The aforementioned example illustrates 
the intent of integrating stress and emotional recognition into training to create intuition 
and good decision making during critical incidents. 
E. SUMMARY 
Researchers suggest that an automatic response, immediate reflex, or a hasty 
decision that occurs during or immediately after a life-threatening situation can be 
mitigated by prior experiences or expertise.315 Researchers who have studied pilots 
during acute stress credit successful responses with prior experiences in simulation 
training.316 Training diminishes the effects of stress during critical incidents by creating 
habits that lead to better decision making using simulated situations.317 Officers are no 
different from pilots; they tend to make decisions that resort to their training and are 
based on experience, intuition, and repetitive training that forms expertise. Officer should 
learn stress resistant skills in training. These skills allow access to long-term memory 
recall with fewer mental resources during a critical incident that can serve as the 
foundation for an assessment of the current situation.318  
Police officers work in a complex world and respond to complex situations. Since 
no one-size-fits-all answer exists to anything police officers do, they must function in the 
abstract. That foundation for their abstract thinking must begin during their police 
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training with exposure to as many possible experiences as they may encounter. Those 
exposures must test their decision making under stressful conditions, so they can 
experience the physiological and psychological effects of stress and overwhelming 
emotions in a controlled environment. Continuous training transforms their learning from 
performance susceptible to hypervigilance and poor decision making to an intuitive 
execution of sound decision making under stress through repeated exposure.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
The preservation of life has always been at the heart of American policing. 
Refocusing on that core ideal has never been more important than it is 
right now.319  
~ Chuck Wexler  
 
The tragic shooting in the Bay Area Rapid Transit system where Officer Mehserle 
responded to a fight in the subway that ended with the death of Oscar Grant reflects the 
need to improve law enforcement training.320 Grant, while lying on the ground, was shot 
in the back when Mehserle mistakenly shot Grant with his firearm, believing it was his 
Taser. During Mehserle’s trial, an expert witness testified Mehserle’s confusion was 
evidence of a phenomenon known as hypervigilance.321 Ron Martinelli testified Mehserle 
never intended to use lethal force against Grant and implied Mehserle overreacted out of 
fear of being killed by Grant.322 Martinelli testified Mehserle’s actions resulted from “a 
lack of appropriate force training and situational awareness” resulting in Mehserle’s 
confusion and panic.323 
This example highlights how hypervigilance can affect decision making in critical 
situations. The disconnect between academic conceptualization and applied use results in 
a lack of understanding in police contexts, a deficit of what accounts for the phenomenon, 
and what deficiencies in mitigation and training techniques may help to prevent adverse 
reactions under conditions that may give rise to hypervigilance.  
This thesis expands on the concept of hypervigilance by understanding how its 
underlying concepts of stress, fear, and anxiety impacts crisis decision making. Current 
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literature on hypervigilance fails to consider how expertise and overconfidence, created 
during training, affects decision making. Rote training, without repeated stress awareness 
and cognitive conditioning through exposure training, contributes to inappropriate force 
training. This thesis: 
1. Enhances law enforcement’s understanding of the cognitive response 
known as hypervigilance during critical incident decision making by 
understanding its separate constructs: anxiety, fear, and acute stress on 
decision making during a crisis.  
2. Recommends transforming law enforcement’s worst-case training, to 
include cognitive conditioning through exposure training to build expertise 
and experience, with the purpose of subsequently reducing hypervigilance 
and overconfidence. 
3. Recommends testing the effectiveness of cognitive conditioning through 
exposure training. A successful measure for implementation of cognitive 
conditioning though exposure training can be shown by a reduction of 
improper decisions during critical incidents. 
4. Recommends future research to determine if the content of a 911 call 
serves to prime officers’ reactions by influencing their perception of the 
situation before they arrive on-scene. 
Expertise and experience go hand-in-hand. Training is the closest replication to 
experience by which new officers start to build their foundational expertise. Current 
training, through repetition, builds false expertise and builds the likelihood of 
susceptibility from hypervigilance through automating responses without applying 
rational thought. Changing the training curricula to those built on cognitive conditioning 
through exposure training by injecting mindfulness and meditation into it may enable 
better, more efficient intuitive decisions grounded in relevant experience and expertise. 
The objective is to enable officers to make optimal intuitive decisions, while being 
familiar with high-stress reactions, thereby making them less susceptible to 
hypervigilance. With regards to the Mehserle shooting, such training might have afforded 
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Mehserle the opportunity to realize he inadvertently grabbed his gun while intending to 
grab his Taser. Mehserle’s actions, while not intentional, resulted from rote training 
without rational thought. Mehserle’s fear from Grant’s perceived threats resulted in a 
hurried decision.  
Exploring real-world experiences and theoretical applications of how 
hypervigilance―segregated by stress, fear, and anxiety―diminish improper critical 
decision making and reactions to erratic responses during a critical incident may lead to 
less susceptibility to hypervigilance. Ideally trained recruits who recognize intuitive 
decisions based on expertise are optimal. Crises that are unfamiliar or surprise recruits, 
however, require an analytical thinking approach. Cognitive conditioning through 
exposure can slow the perception of a situation down to distinguish when it is 
inappropriate to apply a response influenced by the closest training experience they have 
encountered based on the current situation is critical.  
Future research may be needed to shed light on why officers respond the way they 
do, and if receiving a 911 call primes officers’ responses before getting to the situation. 
Training serves as the foundation for officers’ intuition, expertise, and experience to fall 
back on during critical incidents. The comments of a call can serve as an anchoring effect 
that starts a cognitive bias based on the comments to a call and resorts to officers’ 
overreliance on their bias during their decision-making processes.324 If officers receive a 
call that primes their expectations of a situation (e.g., a call about a man with a gun), the 
officers are going to see cues in the environment that confirm these preexisting beliefs, 
even if they may not be accurate (e.g., the man had a pipe in his hand and not a gun). 
Anchoring and priming can be deferential to critical incident decision making since 
working memory rarely resorts back to analytical thinking in a stressful situation.325 The 
inability to think analytically during a critical incident makes it difficult to recall optimal 
references when a situation is different than expected when arriving at a call location.  
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As in the Mehserle example, law enforcement can use cognitive conditioning 
through exposure training to implement steps to ensure officers remain vigilant and in 
control by overcoming the factors that contribute to erratic responses during a critical 
incident. This mitigation starts during exposure training.  
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